

**The Boko Haram Crisis: Responses by State and non-State Actors
to a Security Challenge in the Lake Chad Region**

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BLBYAS001

**A dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of
Philosophy in African Studies**

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ABSTRACT

This study is to demonstrate the response of the international community against Boko Haram insurgency as well as the reaction of the Nigerian government and the regional countries of the Lake Chad Basin (Chad, Benin, Niger, Cameroon) in tackling the violence. Boko Haram has caused severe humanitarian crisis in the region as more than two million people have been displaced. The international community primarily focuses on creating basic secure conditions for refugees to return to their homes in safety and dignity as well as providing technical and military assistance to the Nigerian government in the fight against Boko Haram.

The study begins with the Boko Haram's ideology: Salafism and then next chapter focuses on the phases of the evolution of Boko Haram historically. Their activities were initially localized within Nigeria at the beginning of 2000s. However, the sect started to draw big international attention since 2010. Next chapter, after providing all necessary data, indicates that the responses of the Nigerian government and the regional countries to the Boko Haram violence and the humanitarian, technical and military assistance provided by the international community to the Lake Chad Basin countries are not sufficient enough to tackle the Boko Haram insurgency.

This dissertation is based on compilation, organization and interpretation of the related data. The dataset mostly comprises of books, articles, reports, online data sources, news outlets and press statements of governments and international organizations. Biggest challenge encountered during the data collection process is that there is no enough published material on Boko Haram and the fight against it. Hence the online sources were meticulously surveyed. In addition to this, as Boko Haram continues to occupy the headlines of the Nigerian press and new developments on this subject unfold on daily basis, it requires to thoroughly follow the news outlets.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AQIM: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

AU: African Union

CJTF: Civilian Joint Task Force

EU: European Union

ECHO: European Community Humanitarian Aid Office

FTO: Foreign Terrorist Organization

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross

IDP: Internally Displaced People

IOM: International Organization for Migration

ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

LCBC: Lake Chad Basin Commission

MNJTF: Multinational Joint Task Force

NGO: Non-governmental Organization

OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

ORO: Operation Restore Order

SGI: Security Governance Initiative

TPA: Terrorism Prevention Act

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations

UNICEF: United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USA: United States of America

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

WFP: World Food Programme

CHAPTER ONE

1.0

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Statement of Objective

The objective of this dissertation is to analyze to what extent the international community- *through state and non-state actors*- fights against Boko Haram, which has terrorized the region for a long time by acts of violence in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and especially in Nigeria. Furthermore, this study discusses the counter terrorism efforts of the Nigerian government and its neighbours which are affected by the activities of Boko Haram. More than two million people have been forcefully displaced as a consequence of terrorist attacks of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region countries and this humanitarian crisis has come to the international community's notice. In this context, it should be noted that the measures against this tragedy have mostly been taken by non-state actors. The humanitarian aid delivered by the non-governmental organizations (NGO) is studied in chapter four. However, it should be born in mind that, these efforts aim at resolving the immediate humanitarian crisis rather than fighting Boko Haram. Related chapter of this study focuses on the activities of significant actors instead of generalizing them as the international community. Undoubtedly the United States (US) is the most important player in this sense. Steps taken by the European Union (EU) to resolve the issue and individual efforts of France and the United Kingdom (UK) as well as those of Russia and China are also analyzed.

The hypothesis of the dissertation is that the fight against Boko Haram has not achieved so far. It suggests that Nigerian government and the governments of the neighbouring countries as well as regional and international state and non-state actors have not been successful in their efforts to deal with Boko Haram. The fact that a holistic approach could not be developed constitutes the main reason that lies behind this failure. It is highlighted that sole military intervention cannot suffice to resolve the issue as long as root-causes of Boko Haram are in place.

1.2. Research Methodology

This dissertation is based on compilation, organization and interpretation of the related data.

The dataset mostly are mostly consisted of books, articles, reports, online data sources, news outlets and press statements of governments and international organizations. The biggest challenge encountered during the data collection process is that no sufficient amount of materials has been published on Boko Haram and the fight against it. Hence the online sources were meticulously surveyed. As Boko Haram continues to occupy the headlines of the Nigerian press and new developments on this subject unfold on daily basis, it is essential to thoroughly follow the news outlets.

1.3. Significance of the Study

I have already touched upon the scarcity of publication on Boko Haram as one of the main challenges for academic studies on this subject. This study will make a significant contribution to the literature as it compiles the measures taken in the fight against Boko Haram. Thus, those who are interested in this subject will have the opportunity to compare the actions taken by the actors who take part in combating Boko Haram. Assuming that the further strategies will be developed by taking the past experiences into consideration, it can be said that this study will fill a significant void.

The evaluation section in the final chapter of this dissertation argues that combatting Boko Haram has failed. The primary reason that lies behind this failure results from the lack of a holistic approach. Focusing on symptoms rather than causes of Boko Haram's emergence remains as the main reason why Nigeria and the international community have failed to find a solution. The key significance of this study is to provide the necessary information in order to avoid repeating the same mistakes over and over again.

Boko Haram's actions transcending beyond the borders of Nigeria to Cameroon, Chad and Niger destabilizes the region. This constitutes problems not only for the countries mentioned above but also for the whole international community. However, the security concerns have been overshadowed by the humanitarian tragedy caused by Boko Haram. The approach of the international community in combating Boko Haram shows that finding solutions for the humanitarian tragedy has been prioritized. The relevant chapter of this study is significant as it touches upon the subject of human tragedy which has been ignored by the international community.

The approach to the problem is four fold. First it focuses on the meaning of Boko Haram's ideology which is ``Salafism`` in the second chapter. It is important to understand ``Salafism`` in order to comprehend how Boko Haram motivates its militants and justifies its actions. Second chapter of this dissertation elaborates on this ideology and how Boko Haram positions itself within it.

Second, the dissertation covers the emergence and evolution of Boko Haram. It also examines the causes leading to the emergence of the group. It explains how a movement, which was born as a reaction to a Sufi order in Nigeria, could evolve into a terrorist organization. It discusses the establishment, actions, objectives and methods of Boko Haram in detail. The milestones in the evolution of the group are covered in chronological order in chapter three.

Third, this study elaborates on the efforts by the Nigerian government, neighboring countries, non-state actors and the international community to fight against Boko Haram and the overcome the humanitarian crisis caused by the group, which initially emerged in the context of local dynamics, has become a regional and even an international phenomenon later.

Lastly, chapter four summarizes the findings in the dissertation and analyzes steps, which have been taken so far in tackling Boko Haram. Finally, it makes recommendations for fighting Boko Haram thus creating secure environment in the Lake Chad Basin.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0

SALAFISM

2.1. Theological Foundations

The theological foundations of the Salafi movement are mainly characterized by strong emphasis on the oneness and uniqueness of God (tawhid) and complete refusal of religious innovations (bid'ah) stemming from the human reasoning and desire (Wiktorowicz 2006). Through a literal approach to the interpretation of the Qur'an and Prophetic traditions (sunnah), and following the road of the pious predecessors (al-salaf al-salih) who embraced the religion directly from the Prophet, Salafis aim to achieve the perfect and flawless understanding of Islam (Kassim 2015). The applications of such theological framework to contemporary social and political issues give rise to various differences among Salafis, however essentially the same religious creed (aqida) is shared by the entire community (Wiktorowicz 2006).

2.1.1. The Salafi Creed

Wiktorowicz (2006) argues that the understanding of tawhid is the most central concern in the Salafi creed and it is the major prerequisite of being a true Muslim. In terms of the conditions of belief, Salafis strictly emphasize that God is the only creator and sovereign of the universe, He shares no resemblance with its servants, and He alone is worthy of worship and worshipping other than God or associating partners is disbelief (shirk). For example, Salafis severely criticize Sufism (Islamic mysticism) and its rituals with the accusation that it contains worshipping other than God. The understanding of tawhid for Salafis has profound implications in governing the every aspect of life. The Qur'an, traditions of the Prophet, and the consensus of his companions are the three fundamental sources of guidance. These sources explain and frame the true understanding of tawhid with its implications in belief, thought and life. They protect the origin of Islam and demonstrate the Prophetic model to be followed. Salafis do not rely on other sources with the conviction that they will cause disunity and dispute among Muslims and misguide them away from the straight path.

Salafis are somewhat sensitive that whatever goes out of the frame of the Qur'an and the Prophetic guidance are religious innovations that jeopardize tawhid. In Prophetic tradition the Prophet tells, ``Those of you live long after me will see a lot of differences, so hold fast to my Sunnah and to the Sunnah of the Rightly Guided Khallefahs (successors) after me. Cling to it

tightly and beware newly invented matters, for every newly invented matter is an innovation, and every innovation is misguidance, is in the Fire``(cited in Wiktorowicz 2006, p. 209). Within the aforementioned framework, Salafis refer to themselves as the saved sect (firqa al-najiyya) mentioned in another Prophetic tradition: ``This Ummah (Muslim community) will divide into seventy-three sects all of which expect one will go to Hell and they are those who are upon what I and my Companions are upon`` (cited in Wiktorowicz 2006, p. 209). The overall Salafi understanding rotates around the protection of tawhid as the crux of the original message of Islam and approaching the matters of religion from that perspective.

2.1.2. Human Desire and Reasoning

According to Wiktorowicz (2006), Salafis believe two major factors produce innovations and threaten the purity of tawhid. One is human desire and the other is reasoning. Supremacy of human desire represents the period of ignorance (jahiliyya) and the message of Islam opens a way out of it. Protection of justice and social harmony requires the refusal of human desire to intervene with the matters of religion. Salafis argue that people are tempted by innovations to satisfy human desire and distort the message of Islam and misguide people. Cultural environment in that context is an unsafe zone, which might intermingle with the objectivity of religion. Therefore Salafis take a careful stance against the implications of culture, which give Salafism a global contour. The other challenge to Salafi viewpoint is rationalism and the judgmental usage of reasoning in the matters of religion. Salafis approach the Qur'an and hadith with a literalist attitude considering that the content is explicit, uncomplicated and self-evident. The approach greatly restricts reasoning and interpretation which Salafis consider might lead to deviancy under the subjective interpretations of human desire. The analysis of the sources are rather performed with locating and supporting the proper sources with each other with a literalist approach. In understanding the sources, against the rationalists, Mutazilah and Asharites, Salafis historically stand closer to Hanbalis who avoided treating human intellect and senses as criteria to understanding the matters of Qur'an, such as the nature of God's attributes. Salafis are uncompromising with the Mutazilah approach to reason and revelation as affirming each other and do not rely on discursive argumentation, and rejecting the centrality of human intellect and abstain from metaphorical and allegorical interpretations of the Qur'an. However it should be remembered that the attitude of Salafis toward learning and education is in itself very serious. The true interpretation of the immutable sources of Islam and protecting the essential character of the religion require comprehensive religious knowledge. Therefore particularly in the study of the Qur'an and the

Prophetic traditions (hadith) and many other Islamic sciences, various Islamic universities all around the world, such as Islamic University of Medina, and Umm al-Qura university in Mecca and other study circles are dedicated to produce well-educated scholars. All Salafi groups, including jihadis agree on the significance of Islamic education and stress it.

2.2. Application of the Creed into Contemporary Contexts

Among all Salafi groups, there is a significant consensus on the matters of aqida. However, scholars writing on Salafism are concerned with the application of the Salafi creed to contemporary and particularly political contexts. There seems to be an agreement among scholars about differences of approach to politics and other world affairs do not stem from any significant controversy on the fundamental pillars of the creed. However there are various works trying to explain the fractionalisation Salafi groups, particularly in relation to contemporary issues and politics. Hegghammer (2009) explains the differences between Salafi groups through analytical categories on the basis of political preference and attitude; Wiktorowicz (2006) come up with the categorisation of purists, politicians and jihadis; Kassim (2015) discusses in detail the central role of the interpretation of takfir (excommunication) and hukm bi-ghayri ma anzala Allah (ruling by other than God's laws). The framework of these articles suggests perspective for the placement of Boko Haram within the Salafi context. Besides, Thurston's (2016) analysis of Boko Haram puts significant emphasis on exclusivist attitudes and implications of grievances; and Brigaglia (2015) focuses on the volatile nature of Salafi theology as being an underlying source of Salafi fractionalisation with a specific attention to Boko Haram.

2.2.1. How to Classify: Analytical Categories on the Basis of Political Preference

The essay of Hegghammer (2009, p. 258) does not set out from the Salafi theology but introduce a set of analytical categories made up from diverse political preferences and attitudes of Salafi groups. His hypothesis is that there are five basic rationales explaining Salafi fractions. These are ``state-oriented``, ``nation-oriented``, ``Umma-oriented``, ``morality oriented`` and ``sectarian`` rationals motivating the Islamic activism. Hegghammer (2009) suggests ``state-oriented`` rational aims to change the political structure of the state. ``Nation-oriented`` rational strives for claiming sovereignty on a land taken by the non-Muslim enemy. ``Umma-oriented`` rational fights to protect the entire Islamic nation. ``Morality-oriented`` rational is directed to change social conducts of Muslims. ``Sectarian`` thinking is characterised by a competition between two Muslim sects. As a second layer there

is violent and non-violent division to all of these categories. According to Hegghammer (2009) such a frame allows to understand patterns of political behaviour better than theology-based analysis, provides for a more subtle inquiry about the motivations of Islamic militancy and is able to put Islamic militancy in comparative context. In the complex relationship between religion and politics Hegghammer (2009) emphasises the role of terminology used in determining the purpose of the study. His analytical approach attempts to take out Salafism from its theological borders with awareness for the specific features of Salafism.

2.2.2. Purists, Politicos, Jihadis

The categorisation of Wiktorowicz (2006) acts more from a theological base and consists of three fractions, purists, politicians and jihadis. Purists as the word implies are dedicated to protect the purity of the religion with strict adherence to Qur'an, the Prophetic tradition and the consensus of the Companions. The protection of tawhid, and fighting with the religious innovation stemming from human desire and reasoning are the key motivations. Purists consider the correct application of the creed into life is through propagation (da'wa), purification (tazkiya) and religious education (tarbiya). The purification of the religion will naturally bring justice and order to society. Wiktorowicz (2006) stresses that purists prioritise making da'wa over jihad arguing that the Prophet had started his cause with propagation. Even when early Muslim community was suppressed in many challenging ways the Prophet insisted in making da'wa and give preference to peace. The Mufti of Saudi Arabia Abd al-Aziz Bin Baz says, ``They did not used to call the people to the sword. They used to call the people with the aayaat (verses) of the Qur'an, good speech, good manners, because this was more effective in rectification and more effective in causing others to accept the truth... This is obligatory upon our brothers in Algeria and other than Algeria. So the obligation upon them is to traverse the path of the Messenger (sallallaahu 'alayhi wa sallam) and the Companions when they were in Makkah, with beautiful speech and good manners``(cited in Wiktorowicz 2006, p. 217). Besides Wiktorowicz (2006) argues that purists prefer to distant themselves from interfaith dialogue and even do not actively engage with other Salafi factions.

Politicos is the category Wiktorowicz (2006) suggests for Salafis who aim political change through participating in politics. The position of purist scholars imply religious authority coming from their degree of religious knowledge. For example major religious establishments in Saudi Arabia are dominated by purists. However the criticism coming from politicians focus on the shortcomings of purist scholars in world affairs. The fatwa issued by purist scholars

during the Gulf War letting Americans in Saudi Arabia caused young scholars to criticize the knowledge and capability of purist scholars in political matters. Problems of rulings in Muslim states seemed to politicians as important as tawhid or doomsday. The main line of criticism of politicians is purist scholars cannot read the modern context correctly. Politicians on the other hand believed they are responsible to watch politics for anything against Islam. Wiktorowicz (2006) classifies The Muslim Brother and Sayyid Qutb among the politicians.

Jihadis, on the other hand, are characterized by their advocacy for the use of violence. In comparison to purists, jihadis are closer to politicians. They also criticized purist scholars for being ignorant of politics, and even to the point accusing purists to mislead people intentionally by being the spokesmen of political regimes. Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda speaks out, ``You, our clerics, reconciled with the tyrants and handed over the land and the people to the Jews, the Crusaders, and their hangers-on among our apostate rulers when you remained silent about their crimes, feared to preach the truth to them, and did not succeed in bearing the banner of Jihad and monotheism... You abandoned us in the most difficult of circumstances, and you handed us over to the enemy...``(cited in Wiktorowicz 2016, p. 226). In another example indicating the jihadi stance well, Osama bin Laden criticizes purist scholars, ``The fatwa of any official alim (religious scholars) has no value for me. History is full of such ulama (clerics) who justify *riba* (economic usury), who justify the occupation of Palestine by the Jews, who justify the presence of American troops around Haramain Sharifain (the Islamic holy places in Saudi Arabia). These people support the infidels for their personal gain. The true ulama support the jihad against America``(cited in Wiktorowicz, 2006 p. 227). It is important to remember jihadis do not criticize purists for their belief. The Salafi creed is shared however the conflict is about putting belief into action, choosing jihad as a methodology against the oppressors and unjust rulers and other enemies.

The framework above provides for a scheme and set of clues to situate Boko Haram in relation to Salafi doctrine. Various scholars are also concerned with local and political dynamics that suggest another stratum explaining the characteristics of Boko Haram.

2.3. Theological Foundations of Boko Haram

In terms of theological roots, Boko Haram indicates the foundational attributes of the Salafi creed. Thurston (2016) states that Boko Haram claims to represent the authentic and pure form of Islam similar to other Salafi communities. Standing for the legacy of the pious predecessors (*al-salaf al-salih*), rejection of religious innovation and approaches to

interpretation of the Qur'an are rooted in central tenets of the Salafi doctrine. Muhammad Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, gives a picture of his charge that matches with Jihadi-Salafism. Yusuf says ``We call the Muslim community to correct its creed and its behaviors and its morals... and to give children a correct Islamic education, then to undertake jihad in the way of Allah``(cited in Thurston 2016, p. 12). Thurston (2016) discusses that similar to other Salafi-Jihadi groups, Boko Haram also declared Muslim leaders infidels and embraced the method of jihad against infidel states, and make use of violence justified by strict interpretations of Salafi creed and Islamic law. The leaders of Boko Haram also adopted ideas and positions from other Salafi-Jihadi groups to demonstrate a more global image within a recognized tradition.

2.3.1. Contextualizing Boko Haram

Muhammad Yusuf first appears to be a preacher in a group named Jama'at Izalat al-Bid'a wa-Iqamat al-Sunna (The Society for the Removal of Heresy and the Establishment of the Sunna), hereafter Izala. Izala was mainly motivated to argue against Sufism and its practices. However preachings of Yusuf were mainly revolving around the role of Islam in politics. Thurston (2016) asserts that however Boko Haram is not a wing of Izala, but on the contrary its formation is mainly determined by intra-Salafi conflicts and rivalry. Briaglia (2015) deeply discusses how Boko Haram is separated through looking closer to the rift between Boko Haram and Ahlus Sunna, a fraction appeared out of Izala. Boko Haram mainly had a small-scale community in northern Nigeria and many other Salafi communities in Nigeria later denounced it. One of the main conflicts between Salafi groups was on how to approach to politics, secular constitution and legislation. Kassim, Thurston and Briaglia present various views on how to understand this dispute. The general opinion of Kassim (2015) and Thurston (2016) on this conflict is that Boko Haram has a sharp and strict Jihadi-Salafi approach in comparison to the attitudes of purist Salafis.

2.3.2. Political Theology of Boko Haram

As discussed before, according to Wiktorowicz (2006) purist Salafis suggest that the solution is through propagation (da'wa), purification (tazkiya) and religious education (tarbiya), not rebelling against the rulers in the first place. The approach of purists to takfir is also milder and prevented by variety of criteria. Boko Haram on the other hand regards the constitution, democracy and secular legislation as a direct cause of unbelief and adopts jihad as a method to overthrow the system. Within the discussion of Kassim (2015) and Thurston (2016) there

seems to be three major theological veins make way for the argumentation of Boko Haram, which are al-wala' wa-l bara' (loyalty and disavowal), hukm bi-ghayri ma anzala Allah (ruling by other than God's laws) and takfir (excommunication). According to Thurston (2016), within such framework Boko Haram is characterized by its exclusivist worldview. Needless to say Yusuf's opposition is extremely distanced against what is considered un-Islamic, but also disputes and detached from both other Salafi and Muslim communities. At the nexus of the three aforementioned lenses, theological roots of Boko Haram can be explored.

Mostly used by Salafi-Jihadis, al-wala' wa-l bara' is a principle that presses for an exact and sharp-edged distinction between loyal (al-wala') and true Muslims and disavowal (al-bara') of the others. Boko Haram draws a sharp line between West, democracy, constitution, secularism, and Islam. Yusuf announces that ``The believer will not leave his faith. Likewise, the infidel and the hypocrite will not give up his polytheism and his craftiness. Allah Most High has said, ``Many of the People of the Book wish to turn you back to unbelief after you have believed`` (Qur'an 2:109)... Meaning if you don't follow their goals, you cannot be reconciled with them. There's nothing that can allow you to get along with the infidel and they hypocrite unless you become exactly like them``(cited in Thurston 2016, p. 17). Secular legislation is against the principle hukm bi-ghayri ma anzala Allah, and for Jihadi-Salafis it is a major disbelief therefore a sufficient mark of infidelity. Yusuf asserts that democracy positions people as an authority against God. The consensus of majority has no value; it is the Qur'an and Sunna that order obedience. For Yusuf it is not enough to criticize democracy, it is a matter of belief to take action against it. Democracy is the source that creates infidels, and following democracy or having any relations with it is unbelief. Abubakar Shekau, the latter leader of Boko Haram says, ``The disease is unbelief, and as Allah says, ``Disorder is worse than killing`` (Qur'an 2:191)... Everyone knows democracy is unbelief, and everyone knows the Constitution is unbelief, and everyone knows that there are things Allah has forbidden in the Qur'an, and that are forbidden in countless hadiths of the Prophet, that are going on in Western schools... We ourselves haven't forbidden anything, we haven't told the Muslim community to abandon anything, we simply stand on the path of truth``(cited in Thurston 2016, p. 17).

In terms of taking action against the political system, Boko Haram is well-known for its opposition to Western style education (Thurston 2016). Yusuf considers these schools to make Muslim children adopt Christian and Jewish values and habits, and criticized Muslims

to be deprived of reason due to material expectations. Yusuf criticizes, ``Because of love for this world, many people's hearts have been saturated with love of these schools, until they to not see in them that which contradicts [Islamic] law``(cited in Thurston 2016, p. 15). Besides, secular education is to be abandoned since they train students for government positions and they exert influence in public life.

In addition to the considerations above Thurston (2016) discusses how Boko Haram is fed by the conviction that historically there is anti-Muslim oppression and violence in Nigeria which led Boko Haram to grievance and reprisal. Yusuf argues that ``The government of Nigeria has not been built to do justice... It has been built to attack Islam and kill Muslims``(cited in Thurston 2016, p. 17). The death of Yusuf strengthened the sense of victimhood among his followers. Abubakar Shekau states that ``Everyone knows the way in which our leader was killed. Everyone knows the kind of evil assault that was brought against our community. Beyond us, everyone knows the kind of evil that has been brought against the Muslim community of this country periodically: incidents such as Zangon Kataf... There are the things that have happened without end``(cited in Thurston 2016, p. 17). A year after Yusuf's death, arising with a mass prison break, a guerrilla campaign had started in which many politicians and policemen were killed and banks were robbed. In the following years, as state crackdowns are intensified, Boko Haram conducted suicide bombings, and famously in 2014, more than two-hundred seventy schoolgirls were kidnapped. Shekau statement indicates the logic and motivations of reprisals: ``They're holding our brothers in prison. They've arrested them, tortured them, and subjected them to various forms of abuse. I'm not just talking about our religious leaders—now, they've started to detain our women... Since you are seizing our women, you wait and see what will happen to your women``(cited in Thurston 2016, p. 19).

2.3.3. Volatile Quality of the Salafi Political Theology

The discussion of Brigaglia in many ways questions the framework presented above. Brigaglia (2015) mostly focuses on the fracture between Boko Haram and Ahlus Sunna, a Salafi group which consists of younger generation of scholars than Izala, most of whom had their training in the Islamic University in Medina, obtained in-depth knowledge of the Salafi creed and created links with global network of students educated in Saudi Arabia. In the argumentation between Boko Haram and Ahlus Sunna, Brigaglia (2015) discusses that quietist (purist)-jihadi dichotomy is not a most convenient perspective to contextualize Boko Haram, and holds the volatile quality of Salafi political theology responsible for the

ambiguity. Kassim and Thurston mainly assume that Boko Haram's interpretation of *hukm bi-ghayri ma anzala Allah* and *al-wala' wa-l bara'* and therefore the group's approach to democracy is more extreme in comparison to quietists (Brigaglia 2015). However, Brigaglia puts forward variety of examples to argue that the arguments drawing line between quietists and jihadis are not sharp as they are presumed, and such ambiguities stem from the volatility of Salafi Political Theology.

2.3.4. Quietist-Jihadi Fallacy

Brigaglia (2015) argues that the position of Ahlus Sunna leader Ja'far Adam concerning al-Qaeda's global jihad has been invariably unclear. Even though Adam opposed Muhammad Yusuf's disapproval public education and his support of jihad against Nigerian state, in the global context there is no clear controversy over the jihad al-Qaeda carries out in Iraq and Afghanistan. Conversely, in many of Adam's speeches there is a cautious sympathy towards al-Qaeda's cause in Iraq. Arguing against Yusuf on public education, Adam refers to Osama bin Laden among the examples of <<Muslims who have used western knowledge to retaliate against the aggression of Americans against Islam>> (cited in Brigaglia 2015, pp. 187). Brigaglia lays down these examples not to make inferences about Adam's position over al-Qaeda but to refer ambiguities in quietist-jihadi distinction.

Moreover, concerning the approach of quietists and jihadis to democracy and election, Briaglia (2015) puts forward that participating in elections are not only regarded as disbelief by jihadis but it is also the case for most of the quietist Salafis. There are various fatwas of many quietist Salafi scholars that absolutely prohibit participating in elections on the basis that democracy is unbelief. For instance, Muqbil b. Hadi al-Wadi is one of the most renowned Yemeni Salafi scholars who argued against the jihadis and politicians. Al-Wadi clearly puts that ``democracy is disbelief (kufr) because it means that the mass rules itself by itself; it means there is no Book and no Sunna and no Islam``(cited in Brigaglia 2015, pp. 190). In addition, Brigaglia (2015) argues against Kassim on takfir asserting that takfir is not unique to jihadis but also a characteristic feature of many of the quietist Salafis. There are cases in which Muslim Brothers are blamed for "Leninism" and worshipping taghut or jihadis are labeled as Kharijites because they revolt against the authority. Brigaglia therefore challenges what Kassim sets as distinguishing criteria to situate Boko Haram. These arguments indicate the absence of precise boundaries drawn by certain differences of political theology of quietists and jihadis, which stem from the volatility of Salafi political theology.

In his overall analysis accounting for the genesis of Boko Haram, Brigaglia (2015) takes war on terror into the picture and suggests that in the face of the pressure of war on terror, it is the volatility of Salafi political theology that gives birth to Boko Haram. Essentially, Brigaglia's challenge of quietist-jihadi dichotomy rests on such volatility. Brigaglia recognizes that Wiktorowicz acknowledged that the difference between purists and jihadis are not doctrinal but contextual. However, he disagrees with Wiktorowicz's suggestion that purists should be empowered to prevent the development of jihadis, by underlining that it is the fatwas of purist scholars, which accelerated and fostered theological and ideological extremism among Salafi communities.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0

HISTORY OF BOKO HARAM

3.1. Introduction

This chapter will focus on the birth and the evolution of Boko Haram. History of the group will be presented under five different phases. I start with Phase 0 where the two prominent actors and the dynamics behind the emergence of Boko Haram will be discussed. Following this, I will try to present important turning points of the group's history such as deadly 2009 clashes, rise of Abubakar Shekau as a group's new leader, spreading of violent attacks through the Lake Chad Basin countries and the election of Muhammadu Buhari as Nigerian president.

3.2. PHASE 0: Before 2003 Era

Umar (1993) claims that rise of the national oil economy in 1970s led to some social problems among Muslim community in Northern Nigeria. Oil boom resulted in significant economic growth in big cities. He further explains that people who live in rural regions migrated to urban areas in the hope of finding better jobs and living conditions. Unequal distribution of wealth, goods and services made the urbanization process traumatic for many Nigerians. Loimeier (2012) uses the term ``modernization shock`` to define this transition process. He asserts that aforesaid grievances generated protest against traditional rulers and especially Sufi orders as being unable to tackle with the challenges of modernity.

Abubakir Gumi (1924-1992) was one of the most prominent figures in anti-Sufism movement at the time. In 1978, his followers founded a new religious organization called Izala for removing religious innovation and establishing Sunna (Thurston 2015). Izala became the largest Salafi organization and fueled anti-Sufism in Northern Nigeria after its foundation (Loimeier 2012).

In the late 1980s, some of Izala members had a chance to get higher education at respected Islamic Universities in Mecca and Medina with the help of Saudi Arabian scholarships. This opportunity enabled them to have comprehensive Salafi and Wahhabi discipline and fluency in Arabic as well as to establish closer ties with other students from different Salafi groups. They returned to Nigeria after graduation in the hope of taking an active role in Izala hierarchy and/or federal government. However, there were no available posts for them as old

members of the group were still active and not keen to retire. This increased tension between first and second generation of Izala. Some young members did not hesitate to show their dissatisfaction by criticizing and softening core Salafi doctrine that Izala has already adopted. They were called Ahlus Sunna (Anonymous 2012).

Jafar Mahmud Adam came to the front among young generation Salafis. In 1989, he went to Saudi Arabia to study at Islamic University in Madina (Loimeier 2012). Adam returned to Nigeria with extensive knowledge on Salafism and attracted millions of people with his commitment to the softer form of Izala doctrine (Anonymous 2012). Many young preachers in northern Nigeria joined the Ahlus Sunna network at the time. Muhammad Yusuf was the most notorious one who established Boko Haram (Thurston 2016).

Both Adam and Yusuf were strictly devoted to Salafi doctrine, however there was crucial divergence between the two figures on governmental employment and western education in Nigeria (Anonymous 2012). Yusuf strongly articulated that working for an institution of the Nigerian government and going to school, which follows western education principles were religiously forbidden. By contrast, Adam encouraged western education and governmental employment by saying that these were not religiously forbidden (Brigaglia 2012). Adam expressed that accessing modern education enables Nigerian Muslims to tackle Western enemy. Adam also defended the significance of working for the government in order to Islamize governmental institutions (Umar 2012). Understanding disagreements between Yusuf and Adam is important in order to comprehend main causes that gave rise to Boko Haram.

3.2.1. Who is Muhammad Yusuf?

Yusuf was born in 1970 in Yobe state. As information about his educational background is unclear, Thurston (2016) says that he had a graduate level education while Anonymous writer (2012) claims that Yusuf had no formal schooling background and was self-educated mainly. Yusuf was Adam's leading follower previously, but then tension increased between two fellow Salafis basically due to the aforesaid issues and finally Yusuf has founded Boko Haram. Mostly, young men who had no hope for the future, because of poverty, were influenced by his ultra-Salafi principles and his charismatic authority (Smith 2015).

Yusuf criticized not only the style of western education but also its curriculum that contradicts (according to him) what Quran says. Boyle (2009) conveyed that, in an interview

with BBC in 2009 Yusuf said: ``There are prominent Islamic preachers who have seen and understood that the present Western-style education is mixed with issues that run contrary to our beliefs in Islam. Like rain. We believe it is a creation of God rather than an evaporation caused by the sun that condenses and becomes rain. Like saying the world is a sphere. If it runs contrary to the teachings of Allah, we reject it. We also reject the theory of Darwinism``.

He advocated that it was religiously forbidden for Muslims to study any subjects such as chemistry, geography or biology that contrasted with Quran or Hadith. He also questioned schooling system in Nigeria as it allowed men and women to be in the same class. According to him, educational system in Nigeria is *haram* (religiously forbidden) due to the Government permitted co education in schools. Other vital issue, for Yusuf, was that working for Nigerian public establishment was also haram since Yusuf did not recognize the federal government as an authority as it had not followed Islam. He suggested not to obey the government that was based on unbelief and to overthrow it forcibly for replacing it with an Islamic one. Replacing a non-Islamic government with an Islamic one is the common target for every Salafis. The main distinction is that if it ought be done by using violence or not (Anonymous 2102).

3.2.2. Who is Jafar Mahmud Adam?

Adam started his critiques on Yusuf's arguments by saying that his views on these specific two topics should not be trusted because they had no links with Quran and Sunna; and they are based on inadequate knowledge. Adam claimed that working for government and having western education in Nigeria are not haram for some reasons. First of all, Muslim community did not have a chance to provide religious knowledge-based education to their children since there were no enough schools that follow Islamic curriculum in Nigeria. On the other hand he accepted that it was wrong to be in a same classroom for men and women however he added that this could be changed by well-educated Muslims who hold position in the government. In addition to this, he defended that Muslims have to get western education specifically on medicine, engineering, education etc. in order to tackle problems that Muslim world facing and suffering from. Second, Adam considered that protesting governmental employment would result in harmful consequences for Muslim community since non-Muslims would dominate governmental positions thus there would be no Muslim who looked after Muslims' rights in public institutions. Instead of using force to overthrow Nigerian government like Yusuf suggested, Adam advocated to work in the public institutions in order to prevent harm and changed the system peacefully. He said Muslims have to acquire modern education to

work in the public establishments (Anonymous 2012).

Adam classified people, who think that western education and governmental employment were religiously forbidden, into two groups. According to him, first group consisted of persons that did not have adequate knowledge on Islam; on the other hand he labeled rest as nothing but troublemakers for Muslims. Adam located Yusuf in the second category while placing his supporters in the first group (Anonymous 2012).

3.2.3. Dismantlement of Kanamma Camp

Between 1999 and 2003, Yusuf came into prominence especially in Borno and Yobe states. Often, he was on TV as a spokesperson of Ahlus Sunna. His followers visited Borno frequently to benefit from Yusuf's sermons. 2003 was an important turning point in the history of Boko Haram. At the time, few young Salafis set up a camp in Kanamma village in Yobe state so as to refrain themselves from morally tainted people of Nigeria (Brigaglia 2015). It was based on straitlaced Salafi values and attracted attention of wealthy folks of Borno and Yobe (Comolli 2015). Yusuf was in charge of the camp. Kanamma was serving as a branch of Salafi network in Borno and Yobe, until it was dismantled (Brigaglia 2015).

Anonymous writer (2012) claims that Yusuf had always been wanted to gain political power in order to pursue his aims. He adds that Yusuf's bigoted views, which offered to overthrow government forcefully, inevitably resulted in violent confrontation with Nigerian security forces in December 2003. Seemingly in consequence of disagreement on fishing rights between locals and Kanamma camp members led to fierce conflicts. Yusuf's followers confronted with police forces as well as villagers. Within short time, fight turned into riot in the region. In December 2003, Kanamma members occupied police stations and raised Afghanistan Taliban flag over buildings in Geiam and Kanamma (Onuoha 2014). In January 2004, nearly two hundred Kanamma members attacked another police station. Following this incident, Yusuf's followers were labeled as ``Nigerian Taliban`` by media. Twenty-seven members of Kanamma camp died during armed conflagration while others escaped to neighboring countries and finally security forces demolished the camp in early 2004 (Loimeier 2012).

Brigaglia (2015) claims that Kanamma was not just a simple entity that hosted several Salafis; instead it was an armed training camp. Otherwise, he says, it would not become possible for Kanamma youth to keep Nigerian armed forces busy in a fire exchange for such a long time.

Dispute over fishing rights, Brigaglia adds, was just an excuse for Nigerian authorities to intervene directly in the camp. He also asserts that Ahlus Sunna leaders, including Adam of course, took role in demolishing the Kanamma and they were very well aware of the Nigerian government's intention as they have close links with politicians.

3.3. PHASE 1: Birth of Boko Haram (2004-2009)

Yusuf fled to Saudi Arabia during Kanamma crisis and stayed there for a while as he was declared wanted person by Nigerian police (Williams & Guttschuss 2012). He met political authorities of Borno state as well as his old master Ja`far Adam in Saudi Arabia about his return to Nigeria. During these meetings, which were held in Saudi Arabia, Yusuf was convinced that his ideas on modern education and governmental employment were wrong and promised to tell his followers that he had been mistaken, Adam said. However, after his return to Nigeria in 2005, he broke his promise to Adam for fear of losing his followers (Anonymous 2012).

Yusuf began to express his views in public after his return so as to reach more people. Besides, he aimed to mobilize and train young people militarily who share same ideology with himself. While doing these he never consulted or informed Ahlus Sunna leadership (Smith 2015). According to Brigaglia (2015) Yusuf was motivated by his foreign links to create his own circle and act freely.

Divergence between Yusuf and Ahlus Sunna became more apparent after that time. Finally, Yusuf established his own mosque in Maiduguri, capital of Borno state in northern Nigeria (Sanni 2012). Yusuf's group was called Boko Haram by local people and media since one of Yusuf's main views was about western education (Smith 2015). His group refers to itself as Ahl al-Sunna li'l-Da'wa wa'l-Jihād 'alā Minhāj al-Salaf or The People of the Sunna, for Preaching and Jihad according to the Salafi Methodology (Brigaglia 2015).

After dismantling of Kanamma camp in 2004, Yusuf's group mainly remained silent in terms of militant activities until 2009. However, his followers carried out some hit and run attacks during this period of time. For instance, the group attacked Federal Road Safety Corps in Kano and a police station in 2007. Yusuf constantly refused allegations over his hidden role behind these attacks. Every time Yusuf questioned by Nigerian authorities, he said that violent attacks were conducted by those who were out of his control and he had nothing to do with these acts of violence (Gusau 2009).

It can be said that during this period Boko Haram mainly focused on how to increase its recruitment and financial support. Many allegations were made regarding possible financial cooperation between Boko Haram and its international linkages such as Al Qaeda.

The period of between Yusuf's return to Nigeria and 2009 could be seen most significant years of his leadership (Thurston 2016). Yusuf attracted many people with the help of his impressive rhetoric and charisma. He was promoting sharia while denouncing corrupted ruling class in his preachings. Yusuf's group also supported people economically through micro-financing to assist them establishing their own business as well as helped them to get marry. These developments made him very popular in the eyes of people (Comolli 2015). He also benefited from this period. Yusuf evolved from modest man of God to rich preacher within years (Thurston 2016).

Here, I will start using the term ``mainstream Salafis`` that was articulated by Alex Thurston (2015) to categorize Salafis in Nigeria who do not share same views with Boko Haram especially on acts of violence. The term of mainstream Salafis refers to Ahlus Sunna and Izala members (Brigaglia 2015).

Existing rift between Yusuf and mainstream Salafis widened further in this period. Mainstream Salafis alleged that Boko Haram was founded with the help of external powers that aimed to weaken Muslim community in all aspects. Some Salafis considered that Western powers, Christian South or the Jews played vital role for the emergence of Boko Haram. Adam claimed that Yusuf virtually harmed Muslim community by denouncing modern education, which helped Southern Christians to keep Muslims in ignorance so that they can manipulate Muslims easily. According to mainstream Salafis, Boko Haram was one of the biggest enemies of Northern Nigeria. It is alleged that mainstream Salafis denounced Boko Haram openly in order to give clear response against accusations that they were connected to Boko Haram (Thurston 2015).

2009 violent clashes in five northern states of Nigeria is another turning point after Kanamma in the history of Boko Haram. Group's relatively inactive period came to an end in July 2009 after confrontation occurred between Boko Haram members and security forces (Brigaglia 2015).

Before insurgency began, Nigerian Government formed a special unit called *Operation Flush* that was comprised of police and military staff in order to address prevalent robberies in

Borno state. However, Yusuf claimed that the unit was established for one reason only which was to prevent his group from operating freely and to discommode his followers (Smith 2015). After some time, Operation Flush had been authorized to impose new regulation that made wearing helmets for motorcyclists obligatory. On 11 June, officers stopped Boko Haram's convoy that was heading to the cemetery for burial service for one of its members. Operation Flush officers asked motorcyclists to wear helmets. Dispute arose between parties over Boko Haram members' refusal to toe the line. Security forces opened fire on crowd (Kwaru & Salkida 2009). It is reported that anyone died during abovesaid confrontation however nearly seventeen Boko Haram members were wounded and taken to the hospital (Gusau 2009).

3.3.1. July 2009 Clashes

Violent confrontations finally broke out on 26 July in the city of Bauchi. Dozens of armed Boko Haram members attacked Dutsen police station and an Izala mosque (Sani 2011). Military and police forces reacted by attacking Boko Haram settlement in Bauchi. Violent clashes in the region left more than fifty people dead behind (Mantzikos 2014). It was also reported that nearly two hundred people were arrested. After this incident, Yusuf threatened authorities by saying that ``we are ready to fight to die`` (Pflanz 2009).

On 27 July, Boko Haram members carried out new attacks against police stations and government buildings in Borno, Yobe, Kano and Katsina states where nearly one hundred people were killed (Comolli 2015). At the very moment, worst was happening in Maiduguri. Armed Boko Haram supporters raided police headquarter, homes of police officers and tried to loot police arsenal in the region (Smith 2015). They also attacked prison and freed many inmates after killing guardians (Smith 2010). Numerous local people abandoned their houses as serious confrontations spread to Maiduguri streets.

On the third day of insurgency, military troops that were reinforced with armored tanks and military trucks tried to take control of the city. Intense clashes occurred between Boko Haram and security forces while troops were destroying Boko Haram mosque and headquarter. Nigerian authorities were seriously criticized by international human rights groups over arbitrary detentions and killings during the uprising (Smith 2015). Although these allegations were denied by security forces, a video appeared on Aljazeera website showed extra judicial executions on the Maiduguri streets that conducted by Nigerian officers (``Video shows

Nigeria 'executions' (2010).

Violent clashes came to an end on 30 July 2009. More than eight hundred people were killed across five states during the riot. Yusuf managed to survive, however he was arrested later at his father in law's house where was close to his mosque. He was captured by military forces then handed over to Maiduguri police for interrogation (Smith 2015).

During the July insurgency, Christians also targeted by Boko Haram members, According to Human Rights Watch report (2012), more than twenty nine churches were attacked by militants and thirty seven Christians lost their lives due to the Boko Haram violence.

3.3.2. Yusuf's Killing

On the same day, rumour spread across the country that Yusuf was killed while he was in police custody. After a short time, Nigerian officials made public on national television that he was shot dead by officers while he had been trying to escape. Images of Yusuf's dead body spread quickly across the country (Duodu 2009). On the other hand, it is alleged that Yusuf was arbitrarily murdered by a policeman right out of the police station in front of the crowd (Country Reports on Terrorism 2009 2010).

Transcript of Yusuf's interrogation was published later. It gives us important information about his world of thought (Duodu 2009).

Officer: We went to your house yesterday and we saw a lot of animals, syringes and materials used for making bombs, what were you keeping all that for?

Yusuf: Like I told you, to protect myself ...

Officer: (Cuts in) ... to protect yourself how? Isn't there the authorities, the law enforcement agencies?

Yusuf: The authorities, the law enforcement agents are the same people fighting me ...

Officer: What did you do?

Yusuf: I don't know what I did ... I am only propagating my religion Islam.

Officer: But I am also a Muslim ...

Yusuf: I don't know why you refuse to accept my own (Islam)

Officer: Why should you say Boko [western education] is Haram (sinful)?

Yusuf: Of course it is Haram

Officer: Why did you say that?

Yusuf: The reasons are so many ...

Officer: The trouser you are wearing ...

Yusuf: (cuts in)...it is pure cotton and cotton belongs to Allah

Officer: But Allah said in the Qur'an iqra (read), that people should seek knowledge...

Yusuf: That's correct, but not the knowledge that contravenes the teachings of Islam. All knowledge that contradicts Islam is prohibited by the Almighty ... sihiri (sorcery or magic) is knowledge, but Allah hath forbidden it; shirk (Polytheism or sharing or associating partners to Allah) is knowledge, but Allah has forbidden it; astronomy is knowledge, but Allah has forbidden it ...

Officer: At your place we found computers, syringes ... are all that no products of knowledge?

Yusuf: They are purely technological things, not Boko ... and westernisation is different.

Officer: How comes you are eating good food – look at you, looking healthy – you are driving good cars, and wearing good clothes while you are forcing your followers to sell their belongings and live mostly on dabino (dates) and water?

Yusuf: That is not true. Everybody is living according to his means. Even you are different. Whoever you see driving good cars is because he can afford them, and whoever you see living in want also means he doesn't have the wherewithal.

He was not the only victim of Nigerian security forces` extra judicial executions. Dozens of Boko Haram members including seventy-two years old Baba Fugu Muhammad -Yusuf`s father in law- were executed by police or military forces without any trial (Williams &

Guttschuss 2012).

3.4. PHASE 2: Between Post Yusuf Era and June 2014

After Yusuf's death, his deputy Abubakar Shekau became the group's leader. Most violent period of Boko Haram history has begun under Shekau's leadership. Virtually, he was one of the Boko Haram detainees during the 2009 crackdown, however he managed to escape alive. Yusuf himself said that he was released by a ``true Muslim`` warden after his arrest. (Comolli 2015).

3.4.1. Who is Abubakar Shekau?

A little is known about his early life. According to BBC, which provides one of the few profiles on Shekau's life, he was born in Nigeria's Yobe State (``Nigeria's Boko Haram leader...`` 2014). But it is still uncertain when he was born. Shekau studied at Borno State College of Legal and Islamic Studies for higher studies on Islam after finishing his education under the aegis of a traditional cleric (Ahmed 2014). He was seen one of the most competent scholars in theology among his generation in Boko Haram (Brigaglia 2012). In addition to Kanuri, which is also his ethnic origin, Abubakar is fluent in Arabic, Hausa and Fulani (Ahmed 2014). In his recent videos, it can be seen that he also speaks English. After Yusuf's death, Abubakar married to one of his widows and adopted his children. Shekau never establishes direct communication with his followers; instead, he speaks few reliable ones to convey his instructions (``Nigeria's Boko Haram leader...`` 2014).

Shekau is well known for its brutality. It is acknowledged that he does not hesitate to kill Boko Haram members who do not obey his commands or betray the group in order to maintain his totalitarian hegemony over his followers (Pate 2015). Shekau stands for the highest level in the hierarchy of Boko Haram. Shura Council, which consists of high-level members of the group, comes just after Abubakar in the decision making process. However, it is not mandatory for Shekau to consult Shura Council before adopting a course of action. It is said that Shura does not meet in person too often; instead they choose cellphones to communicate (Pate 2015).

Nigerian authorities have claimed several times that Abubakar was dead. In response to this, he appeared on videos at every turn to disprove the allegations. However, according to Brigaglia (2014) it is very possible that Abubakar is no longer alive and we see an actor in

videos posing as Shekau. Nigerian military even released the image of the dead body of alleged Shekau pretender to strengthen its argument.

3.4.2. Rise of Violence

3.4.2.1. First Year of Shekau: 2010

The sect went into hibernate for one year after July 2009 clashes, before launching new attacks to police stations and other government institutions in order to take Yusuf's revenge. Group's silence was broken in September 2010. After 2009 riot, heavily armed fifty Boko Haram members launched first attack to the prison in city of Bauchi in order to release inmates especially who were arrested during July crackdown (Smith 2015).

During this period, Boko Haram militants adopted new strategies in addition to group's previous tactics in their fight against Nigerian government such as suicide attacks, assassinations and kidnappings. The sect members did not hesitate to assassinate mainstream Salafis who criticize their actions. After the beginning of new wave of violence in September 2010, more than six Boko Haram opponents who were Muslim, have been assassinated in Borno state. Instead of launching massive attacks to kill Muslim clerics who denounced Boko Haram, militants on motorbikes opened fire to murder its opponents. The sect had declared its rivals apostates before assassinating them (Thurston 2015).

On Christmas Eve 2010, Boko Haram militants conducted multiple attacks in Jos, one of the major cities in Nigeria. Seven bombs were detonated at different locations of the city including a market, which was full of shoppers. This was the sect's first bombing attack out of the north as well as in the city of Jos. More than thirty-two people were killed as a result of market bombing. The sect also carried out violent attacks in Maiduguri on the same day. Three churches were targeted by militants and six people were murdered. After a very short time, explosions occurred in Abuja, Nigeria's capital, on the New Years Eve night targeting crowds that gathered in popular place for new years celebrations. It is reported that six civilians have lost their lives (Smith 2015).

3.4.2.2. Suicide Attack Against International Target: 2011

Political figures also have been targeted by Boko Haram in its anti-election assassinations before elections took place in 2011. In one of its lectures, Shekau said that constitution and voting in the elections are idolatrousness evidently. His group used this argument to justify

their acts of violence against Muslim politicians. Borno state candidate Modu Fannami Gubio and his brother as well as All Nigeria People's Party's candidate were killed by Boko Haram members. Militants conducted five bombings, which aimed election campaigns during this period (Smith 2015). There were bomb blasts in the city of Bauchi that left ten people dead behind in May 2011, on the day of Goodluck Jonathan's inauguration ('Boko Haram Fast Facts' 2016).

First suicide bomber attack in Nigerian history was carried out on 16 June 2011 in Abuja (Meehan & Speier 2011). A Boko Haram militant blew himself up in his automobile in the parking lot of police headquarters. More than forty cars were destroyed. This attack showed group's capability of launching such a large attack out of northeastern Nigeria. Suicide bombings were going to be used as a new tactic by the group for attacking police stations, government buildings and churches across the country (Williams & Guttschuss 2012).

As discussed above, Boko Haram historically attacked targets that were affiliated with Nigerian government like army barracks, banks, police stations or schools. The group's attacks also focused on ordinary people who were believed as sinners by militants due to their sinful actions as playing cards and drinking alcohol. Besides, assassinations of significant religious or political figures became common tactic of the sect. However, important shift in the targeting was about to occur.

On the day of 26 August 2011, Boko Haram launched suicide attack against the United Nations (UN) headquarters in Abuja. This was the first international entity targeted by the group. The UN building was located in the area where embassies and public enterprises were situated in Abuja that made international community worried about Boko Haram's capability in conducting new attacks against international targets. Suicide bomber drove his car into the UN compound and detonated the bomb at the parking area of the complex. It was one of the deadliest attacks in the UN history that left twenty-three people dead and dozens wounded (Meehan & Speier 2011).

Within one year, after September 2010, the group launched more than forty-five violent attacks including three suicide bombings and seven assassinations. In 2011 only, more than five hundred-fifty people died because of Boko Haram violence (Williams & Guttschuss 2012).

3.4.2.3. Death Toll Rises: 2012

Boko Haram attacks started to become more curial and violent day after day. On January 2012, heavily armed militants on motorcycles terrorized streets of Kano, Nigeria`s second biggest city while others drove cars with full of explosives. Blasts occurred at different locations of Kano. According to the security forces, five suicide bombings were launched targeting police stations, markets and churches in the city (`Timeline: Boko Haram`s deadly...` 2016). A wave of violence quickly spread across the Kano as a result of series of coordinated attacks. More than one hundred-eighty five people were murdered during the riot caused by Boko Haram. A video of Shekau appeared on YouTube after few days, blaming Nigerian security forces for recent attacks and alleging the sect`s members were tortured and detained arbitrarily by police forces in Kano (Smith 2015).

According to Global Terrorism Index Report (2015), more than 3,500 people have lost their lives between 2011 and 2014 due to Boko Haram`s violent attacks targeting both civilians and security staff in Nigeria. In the same period, the group carried out nearly thirty-five suicide bombings, twenty-eight of which launched in 2012. Unfortunately, worst was yet to come.

3.4.2.4. State of Emergency: 2013

Boko Haram confronted with multinational security forces, which consisted of soldiers from Nigeria, Niger and Chad in Borno State in April 2013. It was reported that more than two hundred people were killed during the clashes with security forces (`Boko Haram Fast Facts` 2016). Nigerian Government declared state of emergency in Adamawa, Borne and Yobe states in May 2013 and sent heavily armed soldiers to the northeastern Nigeria. Troops were sent to the region for two main reasons, which were to increase security at the bordering areas with Cameroon, Chad and Niger to prevent smuggling and to conduct attacks against Boko Haram settlements in Borno state. In addition, local people in the northeast Nigeria established voluntary groups called Civil Joint Task Force so as to fight Boko Haram alongside military (Comolli 2015).

These developments prevented the sect from having a free hand in urban areas. Boko Haram adopted itself quickly to new conditions by focusing on rural areas and reckoning upon more hit and run attacks instead of traditional tactics. Within a short time, security conditions improved in cities, however ungarded rural populations became soft targets for Boko Haram militants (International Crisis Group 2014).

In June 2013, gunmen raided a government school in Mamudo village in Yobe state targeting students who were sleeping in the dormitory and teachers. They opened fire on pupils and set a flame to the hostel, which led to death of forty-two people (McElroy 2013). Three months later after this incident, another school at the town of Gujbe in Yobe state was attacked by a Boko Haram militant who killed forty-four students that were Muslims mostly (Adamu & Faul 2013). Besides, military uniforms wearing gunmen shot civilians at the fake checkpoints at the town of Beni Sheik in Yobe on seventeen September 2013 (`Boko Haram Fast Facts` 2016). According to Global Terrorism Index report (2014) one hundred-forty two persons were murdered. Same report indicates that death toll increased to 1,500 in 2013.

3.4.2.5. The Deadliest Year: 2014

Boko Haram had already benefited from its capability to access neighboring countries for logistical and security purposes although Nigerian Government has taken some steps so as to stop the group in the border region. Nevertheless, the sect has never conducted violent attacks in the neighboring countries until March 2014. Boko Haram carried out its first attack out of Nigeria, in Cameroon. Two militants on motorcycle approached soldiers in a market near Kousseri and opened fire on them. Boko Haram increased the number of attacks not only in Cameroon but also in Chad and Niger within time. Thousands of people in three countries flee their homes and took to the roads in the hope for finding a safe place. Insurgency in the region caused severe humanitarian crisis (Zamfir 2015). In 2014, five hundred-thirty deaths were recorded in Cameroon only that attributed to Boko Haram. (Global Terrorism Index 2015). These developments made the group true ``regional`` threat in the Lake Chad Basin (Mahmood 2016).

There is no doubt one of the most shocking operations carried out by Boko Haram was recorded on 14 April 2014. Militants attacked a high school in town of Chibok in Borno state and kidnapped at least two hundred-seventy schoolgirls, fifty-three of which succeeded to escape in May (Schultz 2014). This incident has attracted huge international attention. Abduction of Chibok girls will be discussed in the coming chapter. However it is important to note that this was not first case, the group kidnapped more than 2,000 women and children since 2014 (Rhodan 2015).

3.5. Phase 3: Violence Spreading (July 2014- Sometime 2015)

Another significant transformation in Boko Haram`s strategy occurred in July 2014. The

group abandoned its policy to operate mainly in rural areas and started to target cities to expand its influence and domination. Militants attacked important towns in the northeastern Nigeria with the aim of taking control. Finally, almost twenty local government areas were under the sect's control as of December 2014 (Zamfir 2015).

Unfortunately, death toll that caused by Boko Haram related violence has increased dramatically in 2014. According to Global Terrorism Index report (2015), 6,644 people died in 2014 due to ongoing insurgency in the region. Same report indicates that Boko Haram, that overtook ISIS, became the most deadly terrorist group in the world in 2014.

At the beginning of 2015, military forces of Chad and Cameroon conducted joint operations against Boko Haram in order to repel militants from bordering areas. They even did not hesitate to cross Nigerian territory during clashes. Security situation in Niger and Chad improved relatively after above said military operations. However, Cameroon was still suffering from Boko Haram's attacks as militants were able to benefit from safe heavens at the Nigerian-Cameroonian border (Adibe 2016).

The day of 7 March 2015 is another turning point of Boko Haram history. Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) on his twitter account. ISIS leader Abubakar al-Baghdadi acknowledged this pledge after five days and rebranded Boko Haram as the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) on ISIS linked social media accounts (Oladipo 2015).

In April 2015 Nigerian security forces launched several operations in order to re-take control over the areas where Boko Haram seized before. Nigerian troops attacked Boko Haram camps in Sambisa Forest in northeastern Nigeria and rescued more than four hundred-fifty women from militant's capture. In addition to this, town of Damasak, where at least four hundred dead bodies were discovered in shallow, was freed of militants ('Boko Haram Fast Facts' 2016).

3.6. Phase 4: Election of Muhammadu Buhari - Present

Nigerian Government has intensified its response to Boko Haram after new President Buhari was sworn in May 2015. New President attaches great importance to regional initiatives in countering insurgency. In September, Buhari gave instruction to the military forces to defeat Boko Haram until December 2015. Boko Haram could not be completely eradicated from Nigerian soil as Buhari promised however government claims that the group is not able to

conduct conventional attacks against security forces like they did before. According to high-ranking military officials, more than 80,000 residential areas were removed from Boko Haram control in Yobe, Borno and Adamawa States in the last six months of 2015 (Elebeke 2015). In addition to this, Buhari administration said that militants have zero control in Borno State which played strategic role in group`s previous operations (Adibe 2016).

There is no doubt that Boko Haram adopted offensive tactics after losing its control over some northeastern places. With it`s ability to adjust itself very fast to new conditions, militants have returned to traditional methods instead of being in direct confrontations with security forces. Conducting suicide attacks remained one of Boko Haram`s major instruments in the fight. The group did not hesitate to exploit vulnerable people in the rural areas for recruit new members.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 RESPONSES AGAINST BOKO HARAM

4.1 Introduction

This chapter elaborates on the efforts by the Nigerian government, neighboring countries, non-state actors and the international community to fight against Boko Haram and the overcome the humanitarian crisis caused by the group, which initially emerged in the context of local dynamics, has become a regional and even an international phenomenon later.

Boko Haram`s activities were initially localized within Nigeria at the beginning of 2000s. However, the sect started to draw big international attention since 2010. Allegations of possible cooperation with other terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al Shabab; the suicide attack against the United Nations headquarters in Abuja which was the first international entity targeted by the group; the spreading out of the violence into Lake Chad Basin although it is against the group`s primary objective which is to create Islamic State under Sharia law in Nigeria; the abduction of 270 schoolgirls in Chibok town by militants; pledging allegiance to ISIS and humanitarian crisis which was caused by the Boko Haram violence in the region have made the group and its activities a transnational phenomenon.

The international community primarily focuses on creating basic secure conditions for refugees to return to their homes in safety and dignity as well as providing technical and military assistance to the Nigerian government in the fight against Boko Haram. However, no government, apart from the states which are party to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) formed by the regional countries, did not want to deploy any troops that may be a party to the conflicts in the regions. Instead, they offered cooperate with the Nigerian government in various fields.

4.2. Internationalization of Boko Haram Phenomenon

4.2.1. Linkages with Other Terrorist Organizations

It is commonly speculated that Boko Haram has established relationship with other terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Shabab (de Montclos 2014). Boko Haram emerged as a local movement; however, there have been significant indications of international cooperation between other violent extremist groups

and Boko Haram since 2009. Mallam Sanni Umaru, previous acting leader of Boko Haram, stated that Boko Haram is just a ``version of Al Qaeda`` (``Boko Haram resurrects...`` 2009). In addition to this, Abu Qaqa, spokesperson of Boko Haram, said in 2011 that they have links with Al Qaeda and they support each other (``Al-Qaeda assist us...`` 2011). In 2012, Abu Qaqa also claimed that Yusuf met Al Qaeda members during his visit to Saudi Arabia in 2011 and they received technical and financial support from them (Mark 2012). According to some reports, several Boko Haram militants have already been trained in Afghanistan (``Nigerian trained in Afghanistan`` 2009).

The US military officials raised their concerns regarding alleged cooperation between Boko Haram and other terrorist groups. General Carte Ham said that AQIM likely shares explosives and funds with Boko Haram (Doyle 2012). Similarly, former Algerian deputy foreign minister claimed that there is coordination between AQIM and Boko Haram (Chikhi 2011). Nigerian authorities also tend to approach Boko Haram as a transnational terrorist group with its links to Al Qaeda rather than as a regional extremist group (de Montclos, 2014). The United Nations (UN) Security Council stated that some of Boko Haram members created relations with AQIM and received training in AQIM camps in Mali (2012).

Boko Haram`s leader Abubakar Shekau openly supported Baghdadi, leader of ISIS, and Al Qaeda`s leader Ayman Al Zawahiri, but hadn`t pledged loyalty to either before (Blanchard 2016). Shekau`s ideology and target selection diverges from Al Qaeda in some aspects. For instance, differently from Boko Haram, Al Qaeda targets more on Christians, Jews and foreigners (de Montclos 2014). Shekau finally has pledged allegiance to ISIS (The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) in March 2015 (``Nigeria's Boko Haram pledges...``2015). ISIS also acknowledged this pledge and referred Boko Haram as the Islamic State's West Africa Province on ISIS linked social media accounts (Oladipo 2015). After these developments, former Nigerian President, Jonathan Goodluck, disclosed that some Boko Haram members were going to ISIS camps for training (``Islamic State 'accepts'...`` 2015).

It is obvious that some important figures in Boko Haram such as Yusuf and Shekau had connections with extremists outside Nigeria. However, there is no clear evidence regarding above said allegations and also no explicit reference to specific terrorist groups` leader. So, claims done by Boko Haram members should be taken with caution. It is likely that Boko Haram members might be using these rumors as a propaganda tool. Also this might be a tactic

to obtain more financial and recruitment support from other terrorist organizations. It's still vague what kind of support Boko Haram obtained from Al Qaeda and AQIM (Ofstedal 2013).

4.2.2. Chibok Girls Kidnapping and International Reaction

Boko Haram militants kidnapped more than two hundred seventy schoolgirls on April 14, 2014 from a school in Chibok, Nigeria's northeastern Borno state (Duvillier 2015). Police reports claim that fifty-three girls managed to escape from militants in the immediate aftermath of the abduction (Abubakar 2014). On the other hand police states that it is still not clear how many girls were abducted as militants destroyed official documents. Families were asked to deliver documents so that official count might be done. Former Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan accused parents of not cooperating with security forces by providing necessary information. This was the first time that former president spoke publicly about Chibok girls on 4 May (Abubakar & Levs 2014).

This wasn't the first case happened in the region actually. According to Amnesty International, approximately two thousand girls and women were kidnapped by Boko Haram since 2014. Chibok girls are small portion of abducted people by the group. However, this case was the only example in Nigerian history that so many young girls abducted (Amnesty International 2015).

It is alleged that kidnapped children are exposed to several insults by militants. United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) report says that ``boys are forced to attack their own families to demonstrate their loyalty to Boko Haram, while girls are exposed to severe abuse including sexual violence and forced marriage to fighters`` (Duvillier 2015, p.1). The same report states that forty-four children –which was four in 2014- were used as suicide bombers in 2015 and 75 percent of child bombers were girls. Moreover, Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari said that Boko Haram uses kidnapped girls as a negotiation tool for asking money from federal government (Wakili 2016).

The abduction of Chibok girls has drawn big international attention. An activist in Abuja started #BringBackOurGirls campaign on twitter. Within a short time, it was Twitter's most tweeted hashtag (Lamb 2016). In addition to this, several campaigns were held around the world. Hundreds gathered in London and Los Angeles to protest Chibok kidnappings (Abubakar & Levs 2014). Many prominent figures including Michelle Obama and Hillary Clinton were holding up placards reading, "Bring back our girls" (Dearden 2014). On 3 May,

2014 John Kerry, the US secretary of state, said that they are ready to give necessary support including intelligence and technical assistance to Nigerian government for bringing Chibok girls back (Wolfe 2014). Also, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in a statement issued by his spokesperson that he condemned the abduction of schoolgirls and called for immediate release on 16 April 2014 (The United Nations 2014).

Following the abduction of more than two hundred seventy schoolgirls in Chibok, Paris Summit for Security in Nigeria was held in France on 17 May 2014 under the host of French President Francois Hollande. The heads of states of Nigeria, Niger, Benin, Cameroon and Chad as well as the President of European Commission, the British Foreign Secretary and the US Deputy Secretary of State participated the Summit. At the end of the meeting, it was decided to take several measures to stop Boko Haram violence in the region. First is to create mechanism in order to exchange information on weapons trafficking, second is to provide secure environment to protect weapons stocks, third is to implement coordinated patrols, fourth is to deploy troops in the Lake Chad Basin and lastly creating mechanism for border surveillance (McElroy 2014).

Nigeria acknowledged the proposal of assistance from the US to save schoolgirls. The US offered support including "hostage negotiation, intelligence gathering, strategic communications, and how to mitigate the risks of future kidnappings" (Jackson 2014, p. 5 of 5). Similarly, the Chinese government offered to provide any information obtained by its satellites to locate where Chibok girls are captured (Lithur 2015). In addition to these, the European Union (EU) passed a resolution "calling on the EU and its Member States" to offer their support to Nigeria in the resolution of this despicable crime and its on-going efforts to protect its citizens and defeat terrorism in all its forms, in full respect of human rights" (European Parliament Resolution 2014/2729, p. 4 of 5). Also, former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper confirmed that his country had become the part of international effort to bring Chibok girls back, however Canadian forces would not engage in fight but were "to provide liaison and to assist Nigerian authorities in their search" (Smith & Sherwood 2014, para. 10).

On May 2014, the United Kingdom (UK) Defence Secretary Philip Hammond said that an RAF Sentinel reconnaissance aircraft has been put into service in the region for locating the Chibok girls (Ministry of Defence & Foreign & Commonwealth Office & Prime Minister's Office 2014). According to the press release, on the second anniversary of the abduction of

the Chibok girls, issued by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2016), London increased its military, intelligence and training support to Nigerian armed forces to save schoolgirls. Nearly one thousand Nigerian military staff received training from UK to prepare themselves for counter-insurgency operations in the North East. Additionally, the UK delivered financial support -worth £5 million- to the regional forces comprised of Nigeria and neighboring countries for fighting with extremists.

Similarly, Israel also offered support to Nigerian authorities after the abduction of Chibok girls. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that they are ready to provide necessary support in finding missing girls and fighting with extremists (Keinon 2014). It is known that Israel sent intelligence experts who are experienced in solving hostage crisis to Nigeria. "These are not operational troops, they're there to advise," the Israeli official said (Cocks & Williams 2014, para. 6).

After more than two years, one of the Chibok girls named Amina Ali, was found in an area close to the border with Cameroon in May 2016. She was identified by a group who works with Nigerian authorities in fighting Boko Haram. Amina was found with her four months old baby as she was forced to marry. Nigerian army affirmed that Boko Haram suspect who is Amina's husband was accompanying her (Segun 2016). She claimed that the remaining girls are still in Sambisa forest where she was found ('`Boko Haram abductees freed...``' 2016). After that, Nigerian government, with the mediation of the Red Cross and the Swiss government officials, has started negotiations with Boko Haram for releasing of the Chibok girls. As a result of talks between the parties, twenty-one of kidnapped girls have been released in October 2016. Although it was alleged that four Boko Haram prisoners have been freed in return for releasing twenty-one Chibok girls, Information Minister rejected the aforesaid allegations ('`Nigeria: Boko Haram releases...``' 2016). Saving Amina and twenty-one Chibok girls renews hope but more than two hundred girls are still in the hands of Boko Haram militants.

4.2.3. Humanitarian Crisis in Lake Chad Basin

Boko Haram violence, in addition to natural catastrophes in the region, caused displacement of many people mainly in North-eastern Nigeria. The security situation in the region has deteriorated since the beginning of 2014 (International Organization for Migration 2014). The number of internally displaced people (IDP) has reached nearly 2,2 million in Nigeria in April 2016. Only eight percent of IDPs are in official sites, the rest of immigrants reside in host

communities. Majority of the IDPs are in Borno (1,427,999) followed by Adamawa (150,718) and Yobe (134,415). Although some IDPs have begun to return home, living conditions on the ground continue to be alarming and majority of people have yet to obtain humanitarian aid. The international community's main objective is to enable these people to get back their home safely (International Organization for Migration 2016).

Boko Haram attacks has caused humanitarian emergency not only in Nigeria but also in Lake Chad Basin. Many Nigerians had sought refuge in neighboring countries. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2015) report indicates that there are 220,304 Nigerian refugees around Lake Chad as of December 2015. Nigerian Neighbors have experienced difficulties to compete with refugee crisis, caused by Boko Haram outrage.

Since 2014, Boko Haram violence started to spread out in Cameroon, Chad and Niger (Blanchard 2014). Attacks on civilians generated internal displacement in these countries too. OCHA report (2016) explicates that approximately three hundred thousand people were internally displaced in these three countries alone.

Inevitably, the increasing number of displaced people is damaging limited resources and worsening food, housing and security needs (United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 2016). 535 million US dollars are needed to meet basic necessities in four countries over 2016 and only ten per cent has been received (OCHA 2016). Due to volatile security conditions in the region, humanitarian organizations are experiencing difficulties in accessing needy people and assessing the situation on the ground.

The international community and NGOs primarily focus on creating basic secure conditions for refugees to return their home in safety and dignity. Unfortunately it is reported that the circumstances in regions of displacement are extremely unstable for voluntary returns due to Boko Haram's attacks to settlements hosting the displaced and to the absence of humanitarian actors in the region (Action Against Hunger 2015). Since the beginning of 2016 only 64 thousand Nigerian citizens entered Nigeria from Cameroon's Far North Region (OCHA 2016).

It can be said that children, women and elderlies are the most effected by the crisis. According to the UNICEF (2015 para.1) ``sharp increase in attacks by the armed group commonly known as Boko Haram has uprooted 500,000 children over the past five months of 2015, bringing the total number of children on the run in northeast Nigeria and neighboring

countries to 1.4 million.`` The crisis in the region is splitting families and creating dramatic suffering. Besides Boko Haram attacks, operations by Nigerian military forces cause similar consequences on daily life in Nigeria.

Boko Haram is not the only problem that affects the Lake Chad Basin area. Ongoing violence and significant migration movements have been compounded by desertification which deepens the food crisis. The OCHA (2016) report shows that 2,97 million people are facing serious food insecurity in the region, the majority in northeast Nigeria.

At the World Humanitarian Summit held in Istanbul in May 2016, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen O'Brien said: ``Lake Chad region is the world's most neglected humanitarian crisis, and Lake Chad Basin ... at this stage is the most under reported, the most underfunded and the least addressed of the big crises we face`` (Whiting 2016, para.6).

Also Yves Daccord, director general of International Community of the Red Cross, stated during the summit that: ``Normally I don't like to compare suffering, but if I look at all our operations ... what we see - in terms of levels of violence, of suffering and most importantly, the gap between the humanitarian response ... and what (it) should be - is possibly the biggest gap we have right now`` (Whiting 2016, para.13).

There are several international agencies and organizations to relieve the humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad Basin such as World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, UNHCR, OCHA, International Organization for Migration (IOM), and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and USAID.

In 2015, ECHO provided € 21.5 million in Nigeria for humanitarian aid. The European Commission has already been playing an important role in providing assistance to the needy people in Nigeria since 2010 (European Commission 2016). The ICRC, on the other hand, distributed emergency food to 325 thousand people both in Niger and Nigeria as of May 2015 (ICRC 2015). According to the recent reports, humanitarian funding for 2015-2016, allocated by USAID for the Lake Chad Basin crisis, will be reaching nearly \$244 million (USAID 2016).

However, it is not possible to say that all necessary steps have been taken so far by the international community to tackle the crisis despite the fact that millions of people are suffering from food shortages and hunger. Approximately 9.2 million people are in need of

immediate assistance in the region (Ibn Chambas 2016). The international community should focus on implementing new tools to eradicate terrorism in Lake Chad basin for creating stable and secure environment in addition to take the action to tackle humanitarian crisis. Boko Haram violence has destroyed roads, schools, police stations and hospitals, discouraging the return of the refugees. Primary issue is to provide necessary conditions for people to return to everyday life at home safely.

4.3. Responses by State and non-State Actors to a Security Challenge

4.3.1. Nigerian Government's Response

Nigerian Government's institutions such as armed forces, the Presidency, the Nigerian National Assembly, the Department of State Services, the Office of the National Security Advisor, the Nigeria Police Force, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, and the Nigerian Emergency Management Agency have been the main actors in fighting extremists in northeastern Nigeria (African Union 2015).

The Federal Government's response to Boko Haram has been criticized from the beginning of insurgency for not responding effectively. In 2011, the late National Security Adviser Owoeye Azazi stated that the military didn't expect the outbreak so wasn't ready for its violent attacks ('`Nigeria not prepared...'` 2011). Military forces are also questioned for having been involved in human rights violations during operations conducted to counter Boko Haram (Amnesty International 2015).

Boko Haram militants carried out an attack to public buildings and police station in Yobe on 24 December 2003. Security forces launched an operation in response to this violence. It was alleged that eighteen militants were killed and some were arrested. On 21 September 2004, extremists this time attacked several police stations in Borno State. During counter attack by police twenty-four Boko Haram members were killed (Onuoha 2010). Police and military forces conducted an operation named ``Operation Flush`` during the July 2009 uprising in Borno. Also, Security Task Force bombed Muhammad Yusuf's house in Maiduguri that ended up with Yusuf's seizure. Later, Yusuf was killed by the police under custody (Aghedo & Osumah 2012). Yusuf's death fueled ongoing clash between Nigerian government and Boko Haram.

Several operations were launched together with the police and other security forces in northeast Nigeria since 2011. First, Operation Restore Order I (ORO) was established in

Borno state with nearly four-thousand troops in between June 2011 to May 2013. Another ORO was formed to fight Boko Haram in Yobe state from December 2011 until August 2013 with 2000 troops. Operation BOYONA was conducted in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states with ten-thousand troops when the state of emergency declared in May 2013. In August 2013, JTF was dissolved (Ross 2014). Newly established army named the 7th Infantry Division launched new operation called Operation Zaman Lafiya as the successor to Operation BOYONA (Amnesty International 2015).

Although several operations were conducted by armed forces, Boko Haram were still able carry out new attacks, possibly due to the lack of cooperation between military branches. Former President Jonathan discharged all military chiefs of staffs in 2014 and the reason of this was never revealed (Ross 2014).

Nigerian government started to take legal measurements in countering Boko Haram as of 2011. Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) was signed by former president Jonathan that enabled government to define act of terrorism and to provide a scheme for the investigation, prosecution, and interdiction of suspects in terrorism cases (Idonor 2011). In 2013, the death penalty for anyone convicted of acts of terrorism was added to TPA.

Insufficiency of Nigerian military response to Boko Haram caused to emergence of civil group in the region that affected by the violence. Young volunteer men, who aimed to resist Boko Haram attacks, formed Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in June 2013 (Ogene 2014). They were lightly armed self-protection groups in units of fifty or sixty young men in northeastern Nigeria. CJTF patrols, detects Boko Haram militants and detains them, creates checkpoints and guards their territories. Within a short time these youth groups became successful in fighting extremists. Former President Jonathan named them new national heroes. In September 2014, government said that CJTF members would acquire technical and training support from Nigerian military (African Union 2015). With the help of their success nearly twelve-thousand Nigerians became volunteer to join CJTF in Maiduguri in September 2014. They helped to create safe environment especially in Maiduguri however they were criticized for attempting human rights abuses such as arbitrary interrogation, torture and killings (Amnesty International 2015).

Nigerian authorities also tried to use different channels such as dialogue and negotiations – even if it was limited and insufficient- with Boko Haram members in order to end insurgency. Government officials, from the beginning, stated that they are ready to hold talks with Boko

Haram. Former President Olusegun Obasanjo met Boko Haram members and delivered their demands to President Jonathan in 2011 (Ajani & Obeteru & Marama 2011). However, no concrete solution has been reached at the end of these meetings. National Security Advisor Colonel Sambo Dasuki, traveled to the region and met representatives of the movement to find nonviolent solution in 2012. He said all his attempts were declined by Boko Haram (Pate 2015). Nigerian officials also made contact with Boko Haram militants after Chibok girls were kidnapped in April 2014. Hassan Tukur, principal secretary to former President Goodluck Jonathan, said that cease-fire agreement that includes release of schoolgirls has been reached with Boko Haram in October 2014 (Sanchez & Abubakar 2014). However, militants conducted new attacks after Hassan's statement and never released all of Chibok girls.

In May 2015, Nigeria's new President Muhammadu Buhari said in his inauguration that Boko Haram would be vanquished within twelve months ('Nigeria has failed to...' 2016). Nigerian security forces have expelled Boko Haram from the region that was previously under the control of extremists. In addition to this, number of Boko Haram attacks notably diminished in the region (Zenn 2016). However Boko Haram is still one of the deadliest terrorist groups in the world according to the Global Terrorism Index report (2015). Besides, Chibok girls are still in the hands of Boko Haram.

In order to fight Boko Haram effectively, defense budget increased from \$625 million (2010) to \$6 billion in 2011 and \$1 trillion in 2012, 2013 and 2014. However, corruption allegations undermine the capability of army (Campbell 2014). It is claimed that political and military leaders use money for their personal interests instead of investing in new weapons and training (African Union 2015). It is also alleged that Boko Haram outguns government forces despite of \$6 billion budget for defense (Udo, cited in Campbell 2014). In addition to these, allegations regarding human rights abuses committed by military forces weakens community's trust in countering Boko Haram. Number of people who criticize government for being heavily dependent on military actions in the fight against Boko Haram is increasing.

4.3.2. Regional Response

Since early 2014, Boko Haram militants have began launching attacks on the Nigerian, Cameroonian and Chadian side of Nigeria's northeastern borders (Blanchard 2016). Thus, Boko Haram violence has spread into Lake Chad Basin although it is against group's primary

objective which is to create Islamic State under Sharia law in Nigeria (Australian Government 2014).

According to Amnesty International report (2015), Boko Haram started to attack major towns of northeastern Nigeria since July 2014. Terrorists seized control in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe state as of February 2015. Nigerian forces launched counter attacks against militants with the help of Cameroon, Chad and Niger to takeover the region from Boko Haram. Finally, control in the area –excluding Mandara mountains and Sambisa forest- was restored by security forces in April 2015.

Extremists attacked Chad for the first time in February 2015 just after its troops conducted a military operation in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigerian territory. It is reported that militants crossed Lake Chad in three canoes and set fire to the village in Chad where more than five residents were killed during the raid (Blair 2015). The Chadian authorities declared state of emergency in its Lake Region. The government also amended terrorism act in 2015 and one Boko Haram detainee was executed in August. Besides, Chad banned women from wearing burqas or full veils in order to prevent suicide attacks and bombings committed by women recently (Blanchard 2016).

The UN Security Council report (2015) stated that Boko Haram militants conducted more than eighty suicide attacks or guerilla style attacks in Cameroon in 2015 that remained one thousand two hundred deaths behind. It is claimed that Cameroon is the country where Boko Haram has launched largest number of attacks in the neighboring countries of Nigeria (Blanchard 2016). Cameroon`s response to Boko Haram has been extreme and subjected to some critiques by human rights organizations. In December 2015, the Cameroonian military forces crossed the Nigerian border and carried out operations in Nigeria in the name of fighting Boko Haram which resulted in more than two hundred deaths (Campbell 2015). Until now, no complaints were made by Nigerian government regarding Cameroon`s operation on its sovereign territory. Besides, civilians have created self-defense groups as similar to CJTF in Nigeria for helping soldiers in countering Boko Haram violence in northern Cameroon. Volunteers have been trained by security forces and government has provided motorcycles so that vigilantes can patrol border areas (Kindzeka 2016). Nigerian President Buhari paid visit to Cameroon and met his counterpart Paul Biya in July 2015. The two leaders agreed to increase cooperation in the war against Boko Haram. Cameroon has sent additional two

thousand troops to the northern part of the country to strengthen security in the region (United Nations News Centre 2016).

Niger is another country that has been affected from the insurgency. Diffa is the region in the southeastern part of Niger that suffered most from Boko Haram violence in the country. The first attack by terrorists was carried out in February 2015. Since that time at least thirty violent incidents have been recorded in the area (United Nations News Centre 2016). Government of Niger declared state of emergency in Diffa region for fifteen days in response to Boko Haram attacks. The authorities expanded the state of emergency for the period of three more months as violence continued in Diffa ('Nigeria declares emergency...' 2015). Nearly one thousand one hundred Boko Haram militants have been arrested in Niger in 2015 (Brice 2015). One of the most lethal attacks by militants launched in June 2016 in Bosso where thirty two soldiers were killed ('Boko Haram attack...' 2016). Inevitably, ongoing instability has damaged trade between countries in the Lake Chad Basin thus food prices has increased dramatically. In addition to this, basic services such as health and education is far from being provided even at minimum level for the locals (International Crisis Group 2016).

In reaction to Boko Haram's increasing attacks not only in Nigeria but also in Niger, Cameroon and Chad has led to seek new ways so as to cope with insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin. For this reason, Nigeria hosted a one-day meeting with the theme "Challenges of Combating Boko Haram in the Sub-region" on 5 May 2014 in Abuja. France, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria agreed to exchange intelligence, increase coordination and hold regular meetings with the purpose of ending Boko Haram. It is also agreed upon that Boko Haram evolved into a regional fact with its strong continental sphere of influence (Owete 2014).

The abduction of Chibok girls has raised awareness in the region. Governments decided to take necessary measures to pacify ongoing violence and foster security in the region after Chibok kidnapping. A Multinational Joint Task Force was re-established by Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) countries and Benin during the defense ministers meeting in Yaounde in February 2015 (African Union & Lake Chad Basin Commission 2015). MNJTF was set up originally in 1998 by Chad, Niger and Nigeria to cope with cross border issues in the Lake Chad Basin. However, Chad and Niger removed their troops from Nigeria in 2013 and 2014 respectively (Amnesty International, 2015). Under the current agreement, MNJTF will be consisting of nearly ten thousand personnel and battalions from LCBC countries and Benin.

The African Union (AU) has already given its support to MNJTF and it waits to be taken into the UN Security Council's agenda. Nigerian, Cameroonian and Nigerien security forces have already begun joint operations. However, Benin and Chad are in the act of deploying their troops (The United Nations Security Council 2015).

Boko Haram has adapted itself in response to regional cooperation. Militants launched new attacks to softer targets by using more women and children as suicide bombers (International Crisis Group 2016). Forty-four children were used as suicide bombers in 2015 and 75 percent of child bombers were girl (Duvillier 2015).

The spreading of violence into neighboring countries led to serious humanitarian crisis in the region. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) report (2016), people who live in areas affected by Boko Haram attacks, have left their houses and migrated to either safe area in their own country or refugee camps in neighboring countries. Nearly 2,4 million people were displaced due to Boko Haram violence in the region.

Human rights groups raise their voices and concerns regarding measures taken by armed groups in countering extremists. The main concern is to protect civilians during operations conducted by local or regional forces in fight Boko Haram (Human Rights Watch 2015).

4.3.3. ECOWAS and African Union

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established as an economic organization in 1975. Over the years, it was agreed that peace and security are the main pillars of economic development. Hence, ECOWAS created its framework to prevent conflicts in the region over the years. However, ECOWAS has been absent in its contribution to peace and security in Lake Chad Basin. This can be explained with two main reasons. First, it was reported that no request was made by Nigerian Government for military assistance. Second, ECOWAS remained silent due to crisis has spread into non-member countries like Cameroon and Chad (Tejpar & Albuquerque, 2015).

In the fight against Boko Haram, major contribution was made by African Union, in terms of counter terrorism assistance, by supporting the re-establishment of MNJTF that enables regional countries to launch military response. Number of troops increased from 8,700 to 10,000 with approval of the AU in March 2016. MNJTF has helped Nigeria in order to retake

some areas that had been occupied by Boko Haram previously. In February 2016 only, joint task forces freed 850 villagers in Nigeria (Clarkson 2016).

4.3.4. The US Policy Against Boko Haram

Ploch & Husted (2016) states that the US administration attaches special importance to the relations with Nigeria for several reasons. First, Nigeria is the most important and influential actor on the continent with its large population and economy and she makes the major troop contribution to the UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. Secondly, Nigeria is the largest oil producer on the African continent and she is one of the top suppliers of the US oil import.

During her speech in the United States Institute of Peace, Linda Thomas-Greenfield (2016a) Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, underlines the importance of Nigeria for the region and beyond. She emphasizes that by 2050 Nigeria will be the most populous country with its 400 million inhabitants. Country's dynamic population will help rapid economic growth and Nigeria will be among the biggest ten economies in the world. She also highlights that the Washington is extremely willing to assist not only Nigeria but also other Lake Chad Basin countries.

Terrorist attacks such as kidnapping of Chibok girls and bombing the UN building in Abuja heightened concerns about Boko Haram among international community as well as neighboring countries of Nigeria. The United States is one of the most prominent actors assisting Nigerian Government in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency. The US seems very interested in following recent developments in Nigeria. However, this was not the case until recently. According to the Tyndall Report, which monitors American television networks' weekday nightly newscasts, there was not single news about Boko Haram in 2013 (Lobe 2014).

The US intelligence community underestimated Boko Haram until the recent attack to the UN headquarters. This was the first violence action against international entity in Boko Haram history (Meehan & Speier 2011).

Washington has taken legal steps in order to act more effectively in the fight against Boko Haram. Top commanders of the terrorist group -Abubakar Shekau, Khalid al-Barnawi, and Abubakar Adam Kamar- were designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists by the State Department in June 2012. In addition to this, Boko Haram was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the US

Government in November 2013. Any information that helps to capture Abubakar Shekau will be awarded with \$7 million according to the State Department's Rewards for Justice Program (The White House 2014b). The FTO designation enables to freeze groups' assets in the US and to prevent financial transaction through banking system. However, this designation didn't produce concrete outcomes as Boko Haram's international linkages in terms of creating funds for its activities still remain blurred. There is no evidence that Boko Haram raises funds after its pledge of allegiance to ISIS. They fund their operations by kidnapping for ransom, robbing banks and trafficking. (Ploch 2016).

American officials express the importance of combating Boko Haram on all levels. It is considered that fighting on the battlefield should not be the only option in countering terrorism. Main causes of Boko Haram insurgency, for instance, need to be addressed. In this context, the US Government underlines its willingness to help Nigerian authorities in its efforts to eradicate poverty and unemployment; establishing rule of law; dealing with weak and ineffective governance; eliminating corruption; probing allegations of human rights abuses committed by security forces, providing proper education to children and weakening Boko Haram's capacity and financing. (Greenfield 2016b). There is no doubt that these issues are also important for Cameroon, Niger and Chad. Necessary measures need to be taken collectively among regional countries in order to be successful.

Promoting economic development thus creating job opportunity for young people is crucial in countering terrorism. Nigerian people have to be given a chance to contribute their own country; otherwise they become vulnerable and open to exploitation of extremists more easily. Washington seems glad that recommendations that made to counter Boko Haram are in accordance with Nigeria's new government's objectives as new President Buhari's campaign was mainly about anti-corruption. Besides, he and his deputy have already declared their assets to prevent possible allegations on unjust enrichment during his term of office. (Greenfield 2016a). In order to accomplish aforesaid objectives, sustainable security has to be provided throughout the country.

In this context, President Obama launched Security Governance Initiative (SGI) between the US and six African countries including Nigeria and Niger during the US-Africa Leaders Summit in August 2014. With this joint endeavor, the US primarily aims to provide assistance for improving partner nation's civilian and military security institutions. SGI focuses on institutions that enable democratic security sector governance. With the help of powerful

institutions, secure environment for economic development would be created by SGI (The White House 2014a).

Defense and State Departments have provided \$40 million Global Security Contingency Fund for Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria to provide cross-border cooperation and to increase security on the neighboring countries' borders. The US Government also funds several programs such as International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, Economic Support Fund, and Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership in order to improve regional security sector capacity; to enhance customs systems; to reinforce financial controls in the context of providing secure environment so that regional countries benefit from mutual trade which helps creating job opportunities for young Africans (U.S. Department of State 2016).

In 2010, Obama administration launched the US-Nigeria Bi-national Commission for holding dialogue between parties in the name of supporting economic reforms, energy sector privatization, anti corruption initiatives and peace in the Lake Chad Basin (Ploch 2016). Last meeting was held in March 2016 with the participation of Nigerian President Buhari and Foreign Minister Onyeama in Washington.

President Obama hosted Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari on 21 July 2015 to show Washington's intention of increasing cooperation with Nigeria by giving assistance to eradicate causes of extremism and help to create new methods to defeat Boko Haram (Harris 2015).

4.3.4.1. Counter-Terrorism Assistance

Cooperation in military sphere has always been complicated between the Washington and Abuja due to the US Leahy legislation. It prevents the US administration from providing military assistance to foreign countries that violate human rights. Washington has continuously raised concerns regarding allegations on human right abuses committed by Nigerian security forces in the fight against Boko Haram. President Obama did not paid a visit to Nigeria during his two African trips in order to express the US's concerns about human rights violations and corruption in the country (Campbell 2014).

Tension between two countries reached its peak in 2014 as the US refused a request of Israel to sell USA-made cobra helicopters to Nigeria on the basis of allegations that Nigerian security forces violate human rights. In addition to this, Washington also seemed reluctant to

share intelligence with Nigerian authorities for the same reason (Cohen 2015). Following these developments, Nigerian ambassador to the US Mr. Adefuye accused American administration to undermine his government's efforts to eradicate terrorism in the region (Simpson 2015). The US officials claimed that blocking sale of cobra helicopters is an exception and Nigeria is receiving other military equipment without experiencing any problem (Arseneault 2015). In December 2014, Nigerian officials announced that they nullify military training mission provided by American security forces to Nigerian Army (Ayansina 2014). This situation has change now. Buhari's election in 2015 shaped relations and cooperation between two countries in a positive way with the help of new President's constructive discourse in the fight against human rights violations.

White House spokesperson Josh Earnest (2015) said that 300 US personnel were deployed upon Cameroon's request and will be working in accordance with Cameroonian authorities. He stated that deployed troops would conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations in the Lake Chad Basin. Earnest also added that they are armed in order to protect their selves not because they will have combat roles on the ground. Deployment of the US security personnel on the ground to Cameroon in October 2015 shows that Obama administration experiences disappointments with regional approach against Boko Haram. This is the second major deployment of Washington administration in the region. After the abduction of Chibok girls in 2014, the US sent 80 security personnel to Nigeria in helping to locate and safe schoolgirls (Londono 2014).

The U.S. primarily supports Lake Chad Basin countries to develop regional solutions in countering Boko Haram. For this reason, Washington encourages the re-establishment of MNJTF and is providing intelligence and equipment to MNJTF forces. Obama administration also offered logistics support -worth \$71 million- and training programs to the military personnel from Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad and Benin (U.S. Department of State 2016).

Abduction of schoolgirls in Chibok has raised awareness on Boko Haram in the world. International community offered assistance to Nigeria in order to find kidnapped students as discussed before. The US deployed drones and surveillance aircraft at the request of Nigerian Government to locate Chibok girls (Campbell 2014). The US also sent 80 armed non-combat infantry troops to Chad in searching schoolgirls (Karimi & Shoichet 2014).

Up to the present, the US has provided counter terrorism assistance worth \$400 million to Lake Chad Basin countries in countering Boko Haram insurgency. Niger is the largest

recipient of military support compared to Cameroon, Nigeria and Chad. After 2014, security aid offered by Obama administration to Cameroon and Chad has increased significantly. Due to human rights concerns, military aid to Nigeria remained low in comparison to humanitarian assistance delivered by the US. However, it was recently expressed that Washington's intention is to improve counter terrorism cooperation with Nigeria (Ploch 2016).

4.3.4.2. Humanitarian Assistance

Boko Haram insurgency has caused catastrophic humanitarian crisis not only in Nigeria but also in Chad, Niger and Cameroon as millions of people have been affected from ongoing violence in the region. According to OCHA (2016), nearly 5,6 million people are in need of emergency food assistance in the Lake Chad Basin. Over the last two years, the United States, through USAID, has provided \$244 million in humanitarian assistance to Nigeria and neighboring countries to tackle emergency needs of people who are displaced due to Boko Haram's violent attacks (USAID 2016). In addition to address basic needs, USAID has also focused on enabling displaced children to have education in refugee camps. Among other things, USAID has established almost 300 informal learning centers for displaced children in the region.

4.3.5. European Approach to the Boko Haram Violence

Nigeria has always been a prominent actor in Africa for European countries, especially for France and UK, for many reasons. First, it is the second biggest oil producer in the continent and European countries are the largest importer of Nigerian oil according to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries report (2016, p.28). Second, Britain, as a former colonial power, has historical ties and interest with Nigeria that shapes relations in a positive way. Latest BBC World Service Poll (2014) indicates that 67% of Nigerians have positive views towards the UK. Third, security is an another important issue not only for Nigeria but also for EU's own interest as illicit trafficking and irregular migration caused by regional violence and terrorism pose a threat to the European borders in the south.

The Boko Haram insurgency attracted more attention from international community after its attacks have spread into Lake Chad Basin countries as discussed before. The response of Britain and France will be examined separately from the EU's reaction to the Boko Haram.

4.3.5.1. The European Union

The European Union approaches Boko Haram insurgency from a different perspective. According to the EU officials, the problem is a result of military misrule, mismanagement of resources and poor governance in Nigeria. Holistic approach is a must in order to eradicate violence and extremism in the region. Root causes of the insurgency have to be addressed to find stable and sustainable solution (European Union 2015).

In April 2016, the EU Commission announced new measures in the Sahel region and Lake Chad Basin, worth € 280 million, for confronting the humanitarian crisis, creating economic opportunities for young generation, improving stability in the region and targeting the root causes of insurgency. € 100 million of € 280 million has been assigned for those who suffer from Boko Haram violence in the Lake Chad Basin. In addition to today's € 100 million, the EU Commission has already allocated € 100 million to the region in January 2016 for tackling the humanitarian emergency (European Commission 2016). The EU Commission has distributed €123 million in 2015 and €107 million in 2014 to provide basic needs such as healthcare, shelter, food and water especially for displaced people in the region (European Commission 2015).

The 6th EU-Nigeria Ministerial Meeting was held in Brussels in March 2016. Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs Geoffrey Onyeama and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini both underlined the significance of respect of human rights by security forces in the fight against Boko Haram (European Union External Action 2016). Previously, the EU raised concerns about reports on human rights abuses committed by Nigerian, Cameroonian, Nigerien and Chadian security forces in the Lake Chad Basin in the fight against Boko Haram. The EU calls for independent investigations in response to the rise of allegations regarding human rights violations (European Union 2015).

In June 2014, a press statement was issued which indicates that the EU, following the UN designation, lists Boko Haram as a terrorist organization. It is also stressed that listing of Boko Haram as a terrorist organization demonstrates the EU's commitment to support Nigeria in countering terrorism, while protecting human rights. The decision came into effect on 29 May 2014 ('EU lists Boko Haram...' 2014).

4.3.5.2 The United Kingdom

Statements made by high rank British officials demonstrate that the UK attaches great importance to security and stability in Nigeria. Former British Foreign Secretary W. Hague said that Britain is the first country to declare Boko Haram as a terrorist organization (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2014a).

A Ministerial meeting on security in Nigeria was held in London in June 2014. Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Benin, Chad, the European Union, the US, France, Canada and the UN were represented during the meeting under UK chairmanship (MacGregor 2014). According to the final communiqué of the ministerial meeting, Boko Haram poses a threat not only to Nigeria but also to the Lake Chad Basin countries, so a regional response is crucial. At this point, it is said that that MNJTF will carry out significant mission in the fight against Boko Haram. In this context, UK announced £5m of UK support to the regional force called MNJTF. Moreover, it is stated that UK, France, Canada, the US, the EU and the UN are ready to work closely with Nigerian and regional forces by giving direct tactical training and advice in order to tackle the insurgency (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2014b).

In 2015, the UK has sent 130 military personnel to Nigeria in order to provide training on media operations, civil-military affairs and command and leadership (Glaze 2015). It is reported that more than 1000 Nigerian security personnel benefited from the above mentioned wide range of training (UK Ministry of Defence 2016). British Defense Secretary Michael Fallon said during his visit to Nigeria that the number of military personnel who provides training will be increased to 300 until the end of 2016. He also added that British personnel will not be involved in fight roles on the ground against Bokom Haram. (MacAskill 2015).

British Minister of State with responsibility for the foreign and commonwealth office Baroness Anelay paid visit to Nigeria in February 2016 to see the conditions on the ground and to observe the assistance provided by the UK Government. During her visit, the minister underlined the importance of countering terrorism with considering basic human rights. She said that the UK is also providing humanitarian assistance worth £6.7 million to deliver basic needs such as food, clean water, shelter equipment and education to the people who are affected by Boko Haram violence and displaced (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2016).

On the other hand, it is also voiced that the UK's assistance to Nigerian Government in the fight against Boko Haram is inadequate in the simplest term. British MP Richard Fuller claimed during the parliamentary debate in 2015 that his government underestimates the Boko Haram insurgency and the tragedy it causes in the region. He also said that the UK is far from making required pressure on Nigerian authorities for change and does not take any concrete measure that will give hope to the people who suffer from violence in Lake Chad Basin. Fuller added that he respects British personnel who try to make a difference in the region however he suggests that his government should provide an active response to combat against Boko Haram (UK Parliament 2015).

4.3.5.3. France

The French Government's involvement in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency began to visible after the abduction of Chibok girls in Nigeria in April 2014. Summit for Security in Nigeria was hosted by France with the participation of representatives from Nigeria, Niger, Benin, Chad, the US, the UK and the EU on 17 May 2014 in Paris. The main target of the Summit was to create cooperation opportunities at international and regional level on particular areas such as intelligence sharing and providing training to the security forces in the fight against Boko Haram (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016).

As discussed before, regional countries which are all francophone began to take direct part in the struggle against Boko Haram violence with the re-establishment of MNJTF in February 2015. After this development France started to attach more importance to Boko Haram insurgency due to its historical ties to those francophone countries. Like other international actors, France also avoids being in a direct military involvement on the ground in Nigeria as well as in Niger, Chad and Cameroon.

Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari paid a state visit to France in September 2015 at the invitation on French President Hollande. The two leaders decided to establish a high-level defense committee within two the Ministries of Defense to increase cooperation between security forces of France and Nigeria (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015).

4.3.6. The United Nations

The UN encourages regional and international actors to develop holistic approach in the fight against Boko Haram. The UN primarily focuses on humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad Basin. The UN, with the help of its entities, such as OCHA, UNICEF and UNHCR,

prioritizes providing clean water, food, shelter and medical aid to those who are displaced due to ongoing violence in the region. In addition to this, the UN also takes comprehensive measures in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria and neighboring countries.

For instance, the UN Security Council added Boko Haram and its leader Abubakar Shekau to its list of groups subject to financial and arms sanctions in May 2014 (United Nations Security Council 2014a). With this decision the UN aims to prevent any group or individual from providing technical or financial assistance to Boko Haram.

The UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force provides technical assistance to the relevant authorities of Nigeria for improving their capabilities to tackle Boko Haram violence in the region (United Nations Security Council 2014b).

After the re-establishment of MNJTF, the UN reiterates its full support to signatory countries of the new joint task force for their efforts to create regional force against Boko Haram. In October 2014, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel and the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa joined the workshop in Yaoundé held by the Lake Chad Basin Commission to develop new strategies and discuss about capabilities of newly created task force (United Nations Security Council 2014c).

The UN underlines the significance of regional response to extremists in the Lake Chad Basin. Secretary General stated that the UN is ready to work with regional partners such as ECOWAS and the AU (United Nations Security Council 2014b).

4.3.7. Russia and China

Nigerian Government turned to East in order to acquire heavier weapons to fight Boko Haram after Washington administration blocked the sale of Cobra helicopters to Nigeria based upon allegations on human rights abuses committed by military forces (‘‘Nigeria: How Russian Arms...’’ 2015). Wagner (2014) asserts that Russia and Nigeria has reached an agreement, which enables Nigerian military to purchase weapons from Russia. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s database, Russia delivered six armed Mi-171Sh and nine multi purpose helicopters to Nigeria in 2014 and 2015.

Nigerian authorities terminated the military training program provided by the US military forces after Washington’s decision to prevent Nigeria from buying helicopters from Israel. Following this development, an agreement on interaction and cooperation between Nigeria

and Russia was signed in December 2014 that enables the two countries to hold regular meeting on security issues in the Lake Chad Basin region (`Arms Deal: Russia, Nigeria Sign...` 2014).

Cameroonian Government began to strengthen its military capability for countering Boko Haram after the rise of group`s violent attacks in the Lake Chad Basin. In this context, Ministry of Defense of Cameroon signed a contract with Russian state-arm-exporter Rosoboronexport for the delivery of Mil Mi-17 military helicopters in Moscow in 2013. This agreement was the first cooperation initiative in the military context between two countries (`Cameroon orders...` 2013).

In April 2015, defense cooperation agreement was signed between Cameroon and Russia to improve Cameroonian military`s capacity in it`s fight against Boko Haram (Mbonteh 2015). The agreement enables Cameroonian authorities to acquire military equipment including missile, cannon, anti-aircraft missile system and armored trucks from Russia. It is claimed that the agreement also includes training program for military personnel and humanitarian assistance for displaced people in the region (Anchunda 2015).

China has always been a significant weapon provider to Nigeria. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute`s database, Nigeria was the largest recipient of Chinese small arms and light weapons export between 2002 and 2010 and 35 percent of China`s weapons export to Africa went to Nigeria during that period.

In October 2014, Chinese and Cameroonian authorities signed a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation. With this agreement, Chinese Government promises to deliver military equipment –worth nearly \$5 million- to Cameroonian security (Bala & Onana 2014).

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 FINDINGS; CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

Boko Haram, which initially emerged in the context of local dynamics, has become a regional and even an international phenomenon as a consequence of the developments later on. The fact that the north-eastern part of the country has economically fallen behind compared to other regions due to maladministration has caused failures in the fulfillment of basic services, especially the education. 72% of the people living in the north of the country live on the breadline, while this rate is 27% in the south. In addition, the fact that the lack of trust in the government among the people because of the widespread corruption has made the region an ideal place for the emergence of extremist elements. Adding Yusuf's charismatic character to this fact, the organization has increased the number of their supporters in a short period of time. The ultimate goal of Boko Haram, which refuses all western elements, especially modern education, is to overthrow the national government and establish an Islamic State.

5.2. Findings

The Nigerian government's efforts to quash Boko Haram by using force have made the situation even more complex than anticipated; because, the armed forces have been involved in numerous human rights violations in the name of fighting the group, which has legitimized Boko Haram in the eyes of the people living in the region. However, the fact that Yusuf died under the security forces' watch in 2009 has led to the beginning of the widespread terrorist activities by the militants. The acts of violence increased day by day and Boko Haram has been among the most dangerous terrorist organizations.

How was it possible for Boko Haram to become an international phenomenon, which emerged within the framework of local dynamics and goals?

First, it is commonly speculated that Boko Haram has relationship with other terrorist groups such as AQIM and Al Shabab. Boko Haram emerged as a local movement; however, there have been significant indications of international cooperation between other violent extremist groups and Boko Haram since 2009. Second, the attack against the UN headquarters in Abuja has shown that the international organizations could also be the target of attacks by Boko Haram. Third, the abduction of more than two-hundred seventy school girls by Boko Haram

had been on the agenda worldwide thanks to the influence of social media. Michelle Obama, Hillary Clinton and many other celebrities supported the campaign launched on Twitter. It has been observed that the support offered by the international community for the government of Nigeria has intensely increased in this period. On the other hand, Shekau has pledged allegiance to ISIS in March 2015. ISIS also acknowledged this pledge and referred Boko Haram as the Islamic State's West Africa Province on ISIS linked social media accounts. The fact that the terrorist attacks by Boko Haram are not limited to Nigeria and these attacks spread to Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin has drawn the attention of the international community to the region. Finally, the outbreak of Boko Haram attacks on the Lake Chad Region had been so effective that the resulting humanitarian crisis was impossible to turn a blind eye to. The UN and many NGOs began to be active in the region to bear a hand to those who were affected by these attacks.

Why is that Boko Haram still poses a threat to the Nigerian and regional communities, and that it cannot be completely rooted out?

In order to answer this question correctly, I think that I need to focus on what the Nigerian government is doing to fight against Boko Haram; because no government, apart from the states which are party to the MNJTF formed by the regional countries, did not want to deploy any troops that may be a party to the conflicts in the regions. Instead, they offered cooperation with the Nigerian government in various fields. In fact, the US refused even to provide military equipment, far from deploying their troops on the ground. The most important factor in this is undoubtedly the human rights violations by Nigerian armed forces in the past. Under these circumstances, on the front lines in the fight against Boko Haram, there are only Nigerian soldiers and MNJTF forces at best. Since the responsible authority for the assistance provided by international community is the Nigerian government, the success or failure of the government has been the success or failure of the international community.

Boko Haram militants seem to have largely been cleared from the region as a result of the recent military operations. However, the President Buhari has repeatedly stated that they are determined to root out terrorism and they will go to the ends of the earth to achieve this. Although there are some problems, it can be said that the regional cooperation has been achieved, at least to a certain extent. Various international aids have been made through state and non-state actors to end the humanitarian crisis in the region as well as to effectively fight against Boko Haram.

So, could the Nigerian government, thus the international community, be successful in the fight against Boko Haram?

Some will answer "yes" to this question. MNJTF troops have achieved considerable success against Boko Haram in the region. The areas occupied by the group have been reclaimed to a large extent and the area where Boko Haram can exist has been narrowed considerably. However, the militants still continue to commit acts of violence, although not as often as before. Adapting itself to the new conjuncture, Boko Haram launches attacks with suicide bombers more often. It is controversial that how far and how long the MNJTF can maintain its relative supremacy. Because, it is known that MNJTF is suffering from financial difficulties. In addition, the coordination and authority problems among the governments in the body do not give a clear idea of how much longer MNJTF will be operational.

I do not think that the Boko Haram's loss of territorial supremacy in the region means that the fight against the group has been successful. First of all, Boko Haram has not been fully rooted out in the region. It still exists and can commit acts of violence although not so often as the past. It is not possible to talk about victory unless Boko Haram militants are rooted out in the region. Otherwise, the situation will resemble the Lord's Resistance Army, which still continues its existence in Uganda and is still involved in acts of violence although it does not constitute a major risk for the country. This should not be considered the ideal solution for both the region and the Lake Chad Basin countries.

5.3. Conclusion and Recommendations

The biggest mistake by the international community has been to stay silent about the terrorist acts of Boko Haram and the resulting humanitarian crisis and not to give the necessary support to the Nigerian government. The Chibok kidnapping constitutes a milestone for the international community in developing empathy about the situation. However, if I am to take 2009 as the date when Boko Haram violence began to spread, five years will take a long time to remain silent.

Moreover, the first presidential statement by the UN Security Council on Boko Haram insurgency was released in 2015. I consider 2014 as the milestone; however, even after this date, the international community has not taken satisfactory responsibility to find a solution to this crisis. There are also understandable reasons why the international community is hesitant to support the Nigerian government. No western states have ever been lean towards deploying

troops to the region and directly intervene with the conflict. Instead, they preferred to share intelligence and to provide the Nigerian armed forces with training and partially technical equipment support. This decision can be regarded as reasonable and plausible; because the foreign troops' involvement in the conflicts on another country's territory may make fighting terrorism more complex in terms of the military assistance for both the sending and receiving states. The states that receive military assistance may find it difficult to manage the potential public disturbance due to the presence of another state's soldiers in their country. Here the issue of sovereignty comes into question. As there is no coordination even among the soldiers of the regional African states constituting MNJTF, it is not so difficult to predict that the Western states' troops will cause disturbances among the people and the regional soldiers.

From the perspective of the states that send military assistance, they will have to create public opinion to legitimize this operation; because, the loss of lives that are likely to occur will certainly cause reactions in the west society. In other words, I can say that the political internal dynamics are important for both the sending and the receiving states. In addition, the already existing western antagonism in the region will deepen if the western troops are directly involved in the conflicts. The western coalition, which has already been fighting against ISIS in the Middle East, does not want to be involved in a new front in their war against terrorism.

The international community, especially the United States, does not lean towards provide weapons or direct financial assistance with the Nigerian armed forces. The Nigerian army's disproportionate use of force, arbitrary arrests, violation of numerous human rights such as unlawful executions and the corruption in the army are among the most important reasons. It may be thought that the worries of the western states are understandable and reasonable. It is, because, nearly impossible to follow how the weapons and military equipment, to be supplied to the armed forces, will be used for what purposes. For these reasons, sharing intelligence instead of providing military ammunition directly to the Nigerian army, training the armed forces in the region to increase their ability to intervene in the conflicts and cooperation in intelligence sharing are the best option under the existing conditions; and, the international community has already preferred to do so.

It is a fact that Nigeria is in need for assistance both financially and technically in the fight against Boko Haram. It is not possible that the Buhari government will be able to deal with this crisis alone. Abuja must convince the international community to help with military

assistance. The first thing that must be done for this is that Buhari will discharge all the soldiers in the army who are involved in corruption and/or violations of human rights, or at best pension them off. Thus, not only the western states will see that the Nigerian government is sincere about reforming the army, but also the locals' lack of confidence in the army because of the past experiences will disappear. Before anything else, the army needs the cooperation with the locals. The intelligence to be provided by the people living in the region can be very effective in the fight against Boko Haram.

As a consequence, it is unfortunately not possible to say that the Nigerian government has adopted an effective policy to fight against Boko Haram. This is also the failure of the international community due to the reasons mentioned above. The Nigerian government needs to be convinced about the impossibility of overcoming this crisis solely by military interventions. At this point, the international community needs to take responsibility, because Abuja does not seem to have been convinced about the seriousness of the matter. It has been stated above that the Buhari administration, which could not get the support as it expected from the west, turned its face to Russia and China upon the US sanctions. However, the western states effort to keep cooperation channels open with Nigeria on the fields such as education, economic development, humanitarian aid and developing the rule of law.

A holistic approach should be adopted for the region to be thoroughly cleaned from Boko Haram. It is not possible to find a solution to the problem without eliminating the economic development gap between the north and the south of the country and the related social inequalities; because, the uneducated and extremely poor locals who have been neglected by Abuja constitute the largest recruitment source of Boko Haram. President Buhari needs to get to the root of the problem and take steps for the economic and social recovery of the region. There is no doubt that it requires a significant amount of resources to achieve this. Oil revenues constitute 70% of the total income of Nigeria. Given the falling oil prices and the economic conditions in the country, a global assistance is needed to achieve the goals mentioned above. In addition, Nigerian government must take up a position to adopt a public administration understanding, which the rule of law prevails, shows zero tolerance to corruption and is respectful to the human rights. Following these steps, it will be possible to see how sincere the international community is about economic and social development upon providing the security in the region with the support of the international community.

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